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A RIGHT TO A HUMAN DECISION
Aziz Z. Huq*
Recent advances in computational technologies have spurred anxiety
about a shift of powerfrom human to machine decision makers. From
welfare and employment to bail and other risk assessments, state actors
increasinglylean on machine-learningtools to directly allocate goods

and coercion among individuals. Machine-learning tools are perceived
to be eclipsing, even extinguishing, human agency in ways that
compromise important individual interests. An emerging legal response
to such worries is to assert a novel right to a human decision. European
law embraced the idea in the General Data Protection Regulation.
American law, especially in the criminal justice domain, is moving in
the same direction. But no jurisdiction has defined with precision what
that right entails, furnished a clear justificationfor its creation, or

defined its appropriatedomain.
This Article investigates the legalpossibilities and normative appeal of
a right to a human decision. I begin by sketching its conditions of
technological plausibility. This requires the specification of both a
feasible domain of machine decisions and the margins along which
machine decisions are distinct from human ones. With this
technological accounting in hand, I analyze the normative stakes of a
right to a human decision. I consider four potential normative
justifications: (a) a concern with population-wide accuracy; (b) a

grounding in individual subjects' interests in participationand reason
giving; (c) arguments about the insufficiently reasonedor individuated
quality of state action; and (d) objections grounded in negative
externalities. None of these yields a generaljustificationfor a right to

a human decision. Instead of being derived from normative first
* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Faith Laken for terrific research aid. Thanks to Tony Casey, David Driesen, Lauryn
Gouldin, Daniel Hemel, Darryl Li, Anup Malani, Richard McAdams, Eric Posner, Julie Roin,
Lior Strahilevitz, Rebecca Wexler, and Annette Zimmermann for thoughtful conversation.
Workshop participants at the University of Chicago, Stanford Law School, the University of
Houston, William and Mary Law School, and Syracuse University School of Law also
provided thoughtful feedback. I am grateful to Christiana Zgourides, Erin Brown, and the
other law review editors for their careful work on this Article. All errors are mine, not the
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principles, limits to machine decision making are appropriatelyfound
in the technical constraints on predictive instruments. Within that

domain, concerns about due process, privacy, and discrimination in
machine decisions are typically best addressed through a justiciable
"right to a well-calibratedmachine decision."
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A Right to a Human Decision
INTRODUCTION

Every tectonic technological change-from the first grain
domesticated to the first smartphone set abuzz'-begets a new society.
Among the ensuing birth pangs are novel anxieties about how power is
distributed-how it is to be gained, and how it will be lost. A spate of
sudden advances in the computational technology known as machine
learning has stimulated the most recent rush of inky public anxiety. These
new technologies apply complex algorithms, 2 called machine-learning
instruments, to vast pools of public and government data so as to execute
tasks previously beyond mere human ability. 3 Corporate and state actors

increasingly lean on these tools to make "decisions that affect people's
lives

and

livelihoods-from

loan

sentencing, and college admissions."

approvals,

to recruiting,

legal

4

As a result, many people feel a loss of control over key life decisions.5
Machines, they fear, resolve questions of critical importance on grounds

1 For recent treatments of these technological causes of social transformations, see generally
James C. Scott, Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States (2017), and Ravi

Agrawal, India Connected: How the Smartphone is Transforming the World's Largest
Democracy (2018).
2 An

algorithm is simply a "well-defined set of steps for accomplishing a certain goal."

Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 633, 640 n.14 (2017); see
also Thomas H. Cormen et al., Introduction to Algorithms 5 (3d ed. 2009) (defining an
algorithm as "any well-defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set of

values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output" (emphasis omitted)).
The task of computing, at its atomic level, comprises the execution of serial algorithms. Martin
Erwig, Once Upon an Algorithm: How Stories Explain Computing 1-4 (2017).
3 Machine learning is a general purpose technology that, in broad terms, encompasses

"algorithms and systems that improve their knowledge or performance with experience." Peter
Flach, Machine Learning: The Art and Science of Algorithms that Make Sense of Data 3
(2012); see also Ethem Alpaydin, Introduction to Machine Learning 2-3 (3d ed. 2014)
(defining machine learning in similar terms). For the uses of machine learning, see Susan
Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using Big Data for Policy Problems, 355 Science 483, 483 (2017)
(noting the use of machine learning to solve prediction problems). I discuss the technological
scope of the project, and define relevant terms, infra at text accompanying note 111. I will use

the terms "algorithmic tools" and "machine learning" interchangeably, even though the class
of algorithms is technically much larger.
a Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency in Algorithms, But Too Much
Can Backfire, Harv. Bus. Rev. (July 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/we-need-transparencyin-algorithms-but-too-much-can-backfire
[https://perma.cc/7KQ9-QMF3];
accord Cary
Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the
Machine-Learning Era, 105 Geo. L.J. 1147, 1149 (2017).
s Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information

Civilization, 30 J. Info. Tech. 75, 75 (2015) (describing a "new form of information capitalism
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that are beyond individuals' ken or control. 6 Many individuals experience
a loss of elementary human agency and a corresponding vulnerability to

an inhuman and inhumane machine logic. For some, "the very idea of an
algorithmic system making an important decision on the basis of past data

seem[s] unfair."7 Machines, it is said, want fatally for "empathy." 8 For
others, machine decisions seem dangerously inscrutable, non-transparent,
and so hazardously unpredictable. 9 Worse, governments and companies
wield these tools freely to taxonomize their populations, predict
individual behavior, and even manipulate behavior and preferences in
ways that give them a new advantage over the human subjects of
algorithmic classification.10 Even the basic terms of political choice seem
compromised." At the same time that machine learning is poised to
recalibrate the ordinary forms of interaction between citizen and
government (or big tech), advances in robotics as well as machine
learning appear to be about to displace huge tranches of both blue-collar
and white-collar labor markets.1 2 A fearful future looms, one

[that] aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market
control").
6 See, e.g., Rachel Courtland, The Bias Detectives, 558 Nature 357, 357 (2018)
(documenting concerns among the public that algorithmic risk scores for detecting child abuse
fail to account for an "effort .. . to turn [a] life around").
Reuben Binns et al., 'It's Reducing a Human Being to a Percentage'; Perceptions of Justice
in Algorithmic Decisions, 2018 CHI Conf. on Hum. Factors Computing Systems 9 (emphasis
omitted).
8 Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and
Punish the Poor 168 (2017).
9 Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of Al, MIT Tech. Rev. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/
[https://perma.cc/L94L-LYTJ] ("The computers that run those services have programmed
themselves, and they have done it in ways we cannot understand. Even the engineers who

build these apps cannot fully explain their behavior.").
10 For consideration of these issues, see Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar & Aziz Z. Huq,
Economies of Surveillance, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1280 (2020), and Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar

& Aziz Z. Huq, Privacy's Political Economy and the State of Machine Learning: An Essay in
Honor of Stephen J. Schulhofer, N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. (forthcoming 2020).
" See, e.g., Daniel Kreiss & Shannon C. McGregor, Technology Firms Shape Political
Communication: The Work of Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google with Campaigns
During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Cycle, 35 Pol. Comm. 155, 156-57 (2018) (describing the
role of technology firms in shaping campaigns).
12 For what has become the standard view, see Larry Elliott, Robots Will Take Our Jobs.
We'd Better Plan Now, Before It's Too Late, Guardian (Feb. 1, 2018, 1:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/0l/robots-take-our-jobs-amazon-goseattle [https://perma.cc/2CFP-3JJV]. For a more nuanced account, see Martin Ford, Rise of
the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future 282-83 (2015).
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characterized by massive economic dislocation, wherein people have lost
control of many central life choices, and basic consumer and political
preferences are no longer really one's own.
This Article is about one nascent and still inchoate legal response to
these fears: the possibility that an individual being assigned a benefit or a
coercive intervention has a right to a human decision rather than a
decision reached by a purely automated process (a "machine decision").
European law has embraced the idea. American law, especially in the
criminal justice domain, is flirting with it. 13 My aim in this Article is to
test this burgeoning proposal, to investigate its relationship with
technological possibilities, and to ascertain whether it is a cogent response
to growing distributional, political, and epistemic anxieties. My focus is
not on the form of such a right-statutory, constitutional, or treatybased-or how it is implemented-say, in terms of liability or property
rule protection-but more simply on what might ab initio justify its
creation.
To motivate this inquiry, consider some of the anxieties unfurling
already in public debate: A nursing union, for instance, launched a
campaign urging patients to demand human medical judgments rather
than technological assessment. 14 And a majority of patients surveyed in a
2018 Accenture survey preferred treatment by a doctor in person to virtual
care.15 When California proposed replacing money bail with a "risk-based

pretrial assessment" tool, a state court judge warned that "[t]echnology
cannot replace the depth of judicial knowledge, experience, and expertise

in law enforcement that prosecutors and defendants' attorneys possess."16
In 2018, the City of Flint, Michigan, discontinued the use of a highly
effective machine-learning tool designed to identify defective water
pipes, reverting under community pressure to human decision making
13

See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.

'When It Matters Most, Insist on a Registered Nurse,' Nat'l Nurses United, https://www.nationalnursesunited.org/insist-registered-nurse [https://perma.cc/MB66-XTXW] (last visited
Jan. 19, 2020).
" Accenture Consulting, 2018 Consumer Survey on Digital Health: US Results 9 (2018),
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-71/Accenture-Health-2018-Consumer-SurveyDigital-Health.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/TU5F-9J82].
16 Quentin L. Kopp, Replacing Judges with Computers Is Risky, Harv. L. Rev. Blog
(Feb. 20, 2018), https:/iblog.harvardlawreview.org/replacing-judges-with-computers-is-risky/
[https://perma.cc/WS5S-ARVF]. On the current state of affairs, see California Set to Greatly
Expand Controversial Pretrial Risk Assessments, Filter (Aug. 7, 2019), https://filtermag.org/california-slated-to-greatly-expand-controversial-pretrial-risk-assessments/ [https://perma.cc/2FNX-U3C9].
1
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with a far lower hit rate for detecting defective pipes." Finally, and
perhaps most powerfully, consider the worry congealed in an anecdote
told by data scientist Cathy O'Neil: An Arkansas woman named
Catherine Taylor is denied federal housing assistance because she fails an

automated, "webcrawling[,] data-gathering" background check.18 It is
only when "one conscientious human being" takes the trouble to look into
the quality of this machine result that it is discovered that Taylor has been
red-flagged in error.19 O'Neil's plainly troubling anecdote powerfully
captures the fear that machines will be unfair, incomprehensive, or
incompatible with the flexing of elementary human agency: it provides a
sharp spur to the inquiry that follows.
The most important formulation of a right to a human decision to date
is found in European law. In April 2016, the European Parliament enacted
a new regime of data protection in the form of a General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). 20 Unlike the legal regime it superseded, 21 the GDPR
as implemented in May 2018 is legally mandatory even in the absence of
implementing legislation by member states of the European Union
(EU). 22 Hence, it can be directly enforced in court through hefty financial
penalties. 23 Article 22 of the GDPR endows a natural individual with "the
right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing,
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her
or similarly significantly affects him or her." 24 That right covers private
" Alexis C. Madrigal, How a Feel-Good Al Story Went Wrong in Flint, Atlantic (Jan. 3,

2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/01/how-machine-learning-found-flints-lead-pipes/578692/ [https://perma.cc/V8VA-F22W].
"

Cathy O'Neil, Weapons of Math Destmction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and

Threatens Democracy 152-53 (2016).
19 Id. at 153.
20 Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]; see also Christina Tikkinen-Piri,
Anna Rohunen & Jouni Markkula, EU General Data Protection Regulation: Changes and
Implications for Personal Data Collecting Companies, 34 Computer L. & Security Rev. 134,
134-35 (2018) (documenting the enactment process of the GDPR).
21 See Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) [hereinafter Directive 95/46].
22 Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision
Making and a "Right to Explanation," Al Mag., Fall 2017, at 51-52 (explaining the difference
between a non-binding directive and a legally binding regulation under European law).
23 Id. at 52.
2 GDPR, supra note 20, arts. 4(1), 22(1) (inter alia, defining "data subject").
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and some (but not all) state entities. 2 On its face, it fashions an opt-out of
quite general scope from automated decision making. 26
The GDPR also has extraterritorial effect. 27 It reaches platforms, such
as Google and Facebook, that offer services within the EU. 28 And
American law is also making tentative moves toward a similar right to a
human decision. In 2016, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that an algorithmically generated risk score "may not be considered as the
determinative factor in deciding whether the offender can be supervised

safely and effectively in the community" as a matter of due process. 29
That decision precludes full automation of bail determinations. There
must be a human judge in the loop. The Wisconsin court's holding is
unlikely to prove unique. State deployment of machine learning has, more
generally, elicited sharp complaints sounding in procedural justice and
fairness terms. 30 Further, the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial has
to date principally been deployed to resist judicialfactfinding. 3 1 But there
is no conceptual reason why the Sixth Amendment could not be invoked
to preclude at least some forms of algorithmically generated inputs to
criminal sentencing. Indeed, it would seem to follow a fortiori that a right
precluding a jury's substitution with a judge would also block its
displacement by a mere machine.

25

See id. art. 4(7)-(8) (defining "controller" and "processor" as key scope terms). The

Regulation, however, does not apply to criminal and security investigations. Id. art. 2(2)(d).
26 As I explain below, this is not the only provision of the GDPR that can be interpreted to
create a right to a human decision. See infra text accompanying notes 53-58.
27 GDPR, supra note 20, art. 3.
28

There is sharp divergence in the scholarship over the GDPR's extraterritorial scope, which

ranges from the measured, see Griffin Drake, Note, Navigating the Atlantic: Understanding
EU Data Privacy Compliance Amidst a Sea of Uncertainty, 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 163, 166 (2017)
(documenting new legal risks to American companies pursuant to the GDPR), to the alarmist,
see Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agreements: The Pitfalls of
Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 65, 92 (2017) ("The GDPR is, in many senses,
excessively burdensome and with sizeable extraterritorial effects.").
29 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (Wis. 2016).
30 See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias:

There's Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It's Biased
Against Blacks, ProPublica 2 (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machinebias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/Q9ZU-VY6J]
(criticizing
machine-learning instruments in the criminal justice context).
31 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (explaining that the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments "indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.

Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995))).
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In this Article, I start by situating a right to a human decision in its
contemporary technological milieu. I can thereby specify the feasible
domain of machine decisions. I suggest this comprises decisions taken at
high volume in which sufficient historical data exists to generate effective
predictions. Importantly, this excludes many matters presently resolved
through civil or criminal trials but sweeps in welfare determinations,
hiring decisions, and predictive judgments in the criminal justice contexts
of bail and sentencing. Second, I examine the margins along which
machine decisions are distinct from human ones. My focus is on a group
of related technologies known as machine learning. This is the form of
artificial intelligence diffusing most rapidly today. 3 2 A right to a human
decision cannot be defined or evaluated without some sense of the
technical differences between human decision making and decisions
reached by these machine-learning technologies. Indeed, careful analysis
of how machine learning is designed and implemented reveals that the
distinctions between human and machine decisions are less crisp than
might first appear. Claims about a right to human decision, I suggest, are
better understood to turn on the timing, and not the sheer fact, of such
involvement.
With this technical foundation in hand, I evaluate the right to a human
decision in relation to four normative ends it might plausibly be
understood to further. A first possibility turns on overall accuracy worries.
My second line of analysis takes up the interests of an individual exposed
to a machine decision. The most pertinent of these interests hinge upon
an individual's participation in decision making and her opportunity to
offer reasons. A third analytic salient tracks ways that a machine
instrument might be intrinsically objectionable because it uses a deficient
decisional protocol. I focus here on worries about the absence of

individualized consideration and a machine's failure to offer reasoned
32 See infra text accompanying note 88 (defining machine learning). I am not alone in this
focus. Legal scholars are paying increasing attention to new algorithmic technologies. For
leading examples, see Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 93, 109 (2014) (arguing for

"procedural data due process [to] regulate the fairness of Big Data's analytical processes with
regard to how they use personal data (or metadata ... )"); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 327, 383-84 (2015) (discussing the

possible use of algorithmic prediction in determining "reasonable suspicion" in criminal law);
Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 636-37; Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated
Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 871, 929 (2016)
(developing a "framework" for integrating machine-learning technologies into Fourth
Amendment analysis).
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judgments. Finally, I consider dynamic, system-level effects (i.e.,
negative spillovers), in particular in relation to social power. None of
these arguments ultimately provides sure ground for a legal right to a
human decision.
Rather, I suggest that the limits of machine decision making be plotted
based on its technical constraints. Machines should not be used when
there is no tractable parameter amenable to prediction. For example, if
there is no good parameter that tracks job performance, then machine
evaluation of those employees should be abandoned. Nor should they be
used when decision making entails ethical or otherwise morally charged
judgments. Most important, I suggest that machine decisions should be
subject to a right to a well-calibratedmachine decision that folds in due
process, privacy, and equality values. 33 This is a better response than a
right to a human decision to the many instruments now implemented by
the government that are highly flawed. 34
My analysis here focuses on state action that imposes benefits or
coercion on individuals-and not on either private action or a broader
array of state action-for three reasons. First, salient U.S. legal

frameworks, unlike the GDPR's coverage, are largely (although not
exclusively) trained on state action. Accordingly, a focus on state action
makes sense in terms of explaining and evaluating the current U.S.
regulatory landscape. Second, the range of private uses of algorithmic
tools is vast and heterogenous. Algorithms are now deployed in private
activities ranging from Google's PageRank instrument, 35 to "fintech"
applied to generate new revenue streams, 36 to medical instruments used
to calculate stroke risk,37 to engineers' identification of new stable

33

A forthcoming companion piece develops a more detailed account of how this right would
be vindicated in practice through a mix of litigation and regulation. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Constitutional Rights in the Machine Learning State, 105 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020).
34 For a catalog, see Meredith Whittaker et al., Al Now Inst., Al Now Report 2018, at 1822 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/AINow_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BCG-M454].
35 See, e.g., David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search: Why One Retailer Kept Popping
Up as No. 1, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2011, at BU1.
36 See Falguni Desai, The Age of Artificial Intelligence in Fintech, Forbes (June 30, 2016,
10:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/06/30/the-age-of-artificial-intelligence-in-fintech [https://perma.cc/DG8N-8NVS] (describing how fintech firms use artificial
intelligence to improve investment strategies and analyze consumer financial activity).
37 See, e.g., Benjamin Letham, Cynthia Rudin, Tyler H. McCormick & David Madigan,
Interpretable Classifiers Using Rules and Bayesian Analysis: Building a Better Stroke
Prediction Model, 9 Annals Applied Stat. 1350, 1350 (2015).
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inorganic compounds. 3 8 Algorithmic tools are also embedded within new
applications, such as voice recognition software, translation software, and
visual recognition systems. 39 In contrast, the state is to date an
unimaginative user of machine learning, with a relatively constrained
domain of deployments.4 0 This makes for a more straightforward analysis.
Third, where the state does use algorithmic tools, it often results directly
or indirectly in deprivations of liberty, freedom of movement, bodily
integrity, or basic income. These normatively freighted machine decisions
present arguably the most compelling circumstances for adopting a right
to a human decision and so are a useful focus of normative inquiry.
The Article proceeds in three steps. Part I catalogs ways in which law
has crafted, or could craft, a right to a human decision. This taxonomical
enterprise demonstrates that such a right is far from fanciful. Part II
defines the class of computational tools to be considered, explores the
manner in which such instruments can be used, and teases out how they
are (or are not) distinct from human decisions. Doing so helps illuminate
the plausible forms of a right to a human decision. Part III then turns to
the potential normative foundations of such a right. It provides a careful
taxonomy of those grounds. It then shows why they all fall short. Finally,
a brief conclusion inverts the Article's analytic lens to gesture at the
possibility that a right to a well-calibrated machine decision can be
imagined, and even defended, on more persuasive terms than a right to a
human decision.

I.

LEGAL ARTICULATIONS OF A RIGHT TO A HUMAN DECISION

This Part documents ways in which law creates something like a right

to a human decision. I use the term "law" here capaciously to extend
beyond U.S. jurisprudence to European directives, and to range across
both private and public law domains capturing the regulation of state and
nonstate action. I take this wide-angle view in this Part so as to develop
an understanding of several aspects of this putative right: the reasons for
which it is articulated; the contexts in which it is applied; and the limits
with which it is hedged. That inquiry is largely descriptive. By surveying
the current legal landscape, I offer a proof of concept to the effect that a

38 See, e.g., Paul Raccuglia et al., Machine-Learning-Assisted Materials Discovery Using
Failed Experiments, 533 Nature 73, 73 (2016) (identifying new vanadium compounds).
39 Yann LeCun et al., Deep Learning, 521 Nature 436, 438-41 (2015).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 117-21 (describing state uses of machine learning).
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right to a human decision is not so outlandish a notion as to be dismissed
out of hand. At the same time, the opacities and limits of current law
provide evidence of the difficulties packed into any effort to vest such a

right in individuals.
A. The European Right to a Human Decision
European law has, in some form, recognized something akin to a right
to a human decision since 1978. Although that right has to date not had
much practical legal impact, the GDPR's enactment may generate a
concrete effect. Historical antecedents to Article 22 of the GDPR also cast
some light on the difficulties of fashioning such a right and discerning its
justifications.
1. Antecedents
An early antecedent of a right to a human decision is France's 1978
law on information technologies, datafiles, and civil liberties. 4 1 Article 2
of this law, as originally enacted, prohibited official use of automated
profiling or personality screening.4 2 So far as I can tell, this measure was
never applied to machine learning, which, in any case, was not in general
usage at the time. Seventeen years later, the European Parliament and
Council promulgated the Data Protection Directive. 43 The latter lacked
independent legal effect on individuals but obliged European Union
member states to enact conforming laws. Article 15 of the Directive

required member states to create a right "not to be subject to a decision
which produces legal effects concerning him [or her] or significantly
affects him [or her] and which is based solely on automated processing of

data intended to evaluate certain

personal aspects." 44 Countries

implemented this provision in various ways, at times differentiating

Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative a l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertes [Law
78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technologies, Datafiles and Civil Liberties], Journal
22 7
Officiel De La Republique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 7, 1978, p.
42 "Aucune decision de justice impliquant une appreciation sur un comportement humain ne
peut avoir pour fondement un traitement automatis6 d'informations donnant une definition du
profil ou de la personnalit6 de l'interessd." Id. art. 2 ("No judicial decision involving an
appraisal of human conduct may be based on any automatic processing of data which describes
the profile or personality of the person concerned."). A second clause extended the same rule
to administrative decisions. Id.
43 Directive 95/46, supra note 21.
44 Id. art. 15(1).
.

41
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between private and public actors. 45 As with the 1978 French law,
however, these measures appear to have had little effect on the ground.46

There is also little evidence of the concerns that motivated Article 15's
inclusion in the Data Protection Directive. 47 Accordingly, its history
yields scant guidance as to how to conceptualize or justify a right to a
human decision.

2. Article 22 of the GDPR
In 2017, the European Commission declared that it was time to take
"an essential step to strengthening citizens' fundamental rights in the
digital age. "48 The result was the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). In effect since May 2018, the GDPR is a comprehensive
reworking of European data privacy and protection rules. Unlike the
earlier Directive, it acts directly on companies and state institutions that
handle covered forms of data. It contains penalty provisions envisaging
fines running into the millions of euros. 49 Its ninety-nine articles cover a
broad array of other topics. But my discussion trains largely on Article

22.
Article 22(1) of the GDPR vests natural persons with a "right not to be
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including
profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly

" See, e.g., D.Lgs. 30 giugno 2003, n.196, in G.U. July 29, 2003, n.174 (It.),
http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir: stato: decreto.legislativo:2003-06-30;196! vig=
[https://perma.cc/7X3A-D23Q] (distinguishing public actors, and imposing an absolute
prohibition on exclusively using automated data processing in relation to judicial proceedings,
but creating a right to object to automated decisions by private actors).
46 See Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive
and Automated Profiling, 17 Computer L. & Security Rev. 17, 21 (2001) (describing the right
as a "house of cards"). Only one German decision seems to have touched on this right. Isak
Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on
Profiling, in EU Internet Law: Regulation and Enforcement 77, 87-88 n.36 (TatianaEleni Synodinou et al. eds., 2017) (describing a German decision that found that credit-scoring
systems fall outside the scope of Article 15 and implementing domestic legislation).
47 Bygrave asserts that the Article was motivated by "the potential for ... automatisation to
diminish the role played by persons in shaping important decision-making processes."
Bygrave, supra note 46, at 18. But this is a tautology, not an explanation of why machine
decisions are to be disfavored in relation to human ones.
48 European Commission Fact Sheet MEMO/17/1441, Questions and Answers-Data
Protection Reform Package (May 24, 2017).
49 Jan Philipp Albrecht, How the GDPR Will Change the World, 2 Eur. Data Protection L.
Rev. 287, 287 (2016) (describing the sanctions regime).
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significantly affects him or her." 5 0 According to the European
Commission Data Protection Working Party created by the EU, Article

22(1) applies only if "there is no human involvement in the decision
process."" Further, the Working Party guidance document suggests that

"meaningful" ex post review of an automated decision would remove it
from the scope of Article 22(1).52 The GDPR does not explain how the
quality of such review is to be assessed.5 3 The precise range of automated
machine-learning tools captured by the prohibition thus remains up for
grabs. Article 22(2) goes on from this to exclude processing "necessary

for entering into, or performance of, a contract"; otherwise authorized by
"Union or Member State law"; or "based on the data subject's explicit
consent." 54 So far, no European state has carved exceptions under Article
22(2). The potential scope of the consent exception might be limited.5 5
But it is also possible to imagine private entities acquiring such consent
as a matter of course. Whether state employers or welfare agencies could
do the same, however, is a different matter. 56
Article 22 is not the only element of the GDPR that might be glossed
as a right against processing. Article 18 allows natural persons to
50 GDPR, supra note 20, art. 22(1).

2

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual DecisionMaking and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 20 (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource-center/W29-auto-decision-profiling_02-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZT2L-BVXT] [hereinafter Working Party Guidelines].
52

Id. at 20-21 (excluding from Article 22(1) instances in which a human "reviews and takes

account of other factors in making the final decision").
53

It is not clear what "meaningful" supervision entails. Michael Veale & Lilian Edwards,

Clarity, Surprises, and Further Questions in the Article 29 Working Party Draft Guidance on
Automated Decision-Making and Profiling, 34 Computer L. & Security Rev. 398, 401 (2018)

("How this expanded notion of 'solely' could practically be assessed from the point of view
of the data controller or the data subject is one of the significant grey areas th[e] guidance

leaves in its wake."). In addition, if an automated process does not change "legal rights" or
have an "equivalent or similarly significant" effect, the Working Party suggests that it is not
covered by Article 22(1). Working Party Guidelines, supra note 51, at 21-22 (noting that while

targeted advertising is not typically covered, the "intmsiveness" of the targeting, an
individual's expectations, the way the advertisement is delivered, and the operator's

knowledge of the "vulnerabilities" of the person might render it covered by Article 22(1)).
14 GDPR, supra note 20, art. 22(2).

ss The GDPR also defines consent in very narrow and demanding terms. Id. art. 4(11).
56 The antecedent to the GDPR, the first Data Protection Directive, was interpreted in light
of the proportionality principle employed across European public law. See Charlotte Bagger
Tranberg, Proportionality and Data Protection in the Case Law of the European Court of
Justice, 1 Int'l Data Privacy L. 239, 239-40 (2011) (summarizing case law). The uncertainty
over how proportionality review would be applied to the GDPR adds yet more difficulty to

predicting the law's path.

624

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:611

"obtain . . . restriction[s]" on unlawful or inaccurate data processing,5 7

while Article 21's "right to object" mandates that an entity "no longer
process" a person's data once "compelling legitimate grounds" have been
invoked. 58 Given the broad definitions of "processing" 59 and "profiling," 60
these other provisions might be construed to bar some machine decisions.
Again, the absence of implementation by national governments or
enforcement actions by private, national, or supranational authorities
means that there is much uncertainty about what any of these provisions
mean, let alone whether they are properly glossed to include a right to a
human decision.
The principal element of the GDPR to attract attention so far is the
potential right to an explanation of algorithmic decisions, which is located
elsewhere in the document. 61 The right to a human decision, whether
anchored in Article 22(1) or elsewhere, has precipitated contrastingly
little scholarly attention to date. 62
B. American Law and the Right to a Human Decision
There is no precise analog in U.S. law to the GDPR. This Section
adumbrates three legal domains in which hints can be discerned. Knitting

5 GDPR, supra note 20, art. 18.

Id. art. 21(1).
is defined in relevant pat to include "any operation or set of operations which is
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means."
58

9 This

Id. art. 4(2).
60 This is defined to include:
any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to
analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work,
economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour,
location or movements.
Id. art. 4(4).
61 There is some debate on whether the GDPR should be interpreted to create such a right.
Compare Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7
Int'l Data Privacy L. 76, 77-78 (2017) (arguing against the inference of a right to an
explanation), with Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right
to Explanation, 7 Int'l Data Privacy L. 233, 234 (2017) (offering a "positive conception of the
right").
62 See Veale & Edwards, supra note 53, at 400-01 (noting ambiguities in current
formulation); see also Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political
Constructions of Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 Soc. Stud. Sci. 216, 224 (2017)
(flagging the existence of Article 22, and noting that it provides something like a right to a
human decision). This is one of very few previous articles to address this topic.
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these together reveals the inchoate shadow of a right to a human decision
lurking in the interstices of federal and state law.
First, constitutional law at both the state and the federal level already
creates individual rights to modes of decision making that are inconsistent
with at least certain applications of machine learning. Consider the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases. 63 Ignore for present
purposes the ubiquity of plea bargaining, 64 and construe the

Constitution's entitlement to a jury determination as a right to a human
decision. In the original Constitution's scheme, juries were interposed at
critical instances when coercive state power was wielded against
individuals. 65 Jurors' obligation was "an active one" presupposing an
autonomous exercise of human judgment. 66 So if the Sixth Amendment
is violated by substitution of a judge for jurors, it is hard to see how the
pivotal decisional role in a criminal trial could be played by a machine.
Similarly, the use of a machine decision to increase a defendant's

sentence beyond a statutory maximum may violate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. 67 Further, the Confrontation Clause might
create an additional friction on the adoption of machine decisions. 68
Second, the idea of due process might also be grounds for a mandatory
human decision rather than a machine judgment. At its core, the idea of
procedural due process is thought to entail "notice and some kind of

63 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes ... shall be by Jury .... "); id.
amend. VI (right to "an impartial jury"); id. amend. VII (right to "trialby jury" in certain civil
cases); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (affirming the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right in contradistinction to judicial factfinding).
64 See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 Yale L.J. 857, 859 (2000).
65 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1183
(1991); see also Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev.

582, 584-85 (1939) (emphasizing the broad scope of juries' decisional power on questions of
both fact and law in the Founding era).
66 Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification As Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 579, 589 (2014); see also Jeffrey
Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 22-24, 68-75 (1994)
(discussing the history of the development of the jury as a political institution in colonial
America).
67 See Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). So-called evidence-based
tools are widely used in sentencing contexts already, albeit without rigorous direction and
safeguards. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 Geo. L.J. 57, 66 (2018) (describing the

deployment of actuarial sentencing tools, often "without guidance as to the purposes for which
[they] may be used"). As a general matter, they appear to be employed to guide judges'
exercise of discretion over sentence length within the bounds set by the Sixth Amendment.
John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 Ann. Rev.
Clinical Psychol. 489, 500-01 (2016).
68 See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 Yale L.J. 1972, 2039-51 (2017).
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hearing." 69 There is some debate about the timing and the content of a
hearing, at least so far as the Constitution's due process guarantee is
concerned. 70 But it is not hard to see how a question could arise whether
due process is supplied by a machine decision. Indeed, it is arguably

difficult to make sense of the idea of a "hearing" in the absence of a
natural person who is either physically present for verbal arguments, or
who reads and evaluates written submissions.71
To date, there has not been a frontal challenge to algorithmic tools on
Sixth Amendment or due process grounds. This is perhaps because such
instruments have so far been used to support human decision making
rather than formally ousting it. But the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a
2016 decision called State v. Loomis, resolved a due process challenge

hinging on a criminal defendant's challenge to a sentencing algorithm's
criteria (as distinct from its very use). 72 The defendant's argument in part
rested on the defendant's limited ability to review the algorithm's terms
and in part upon the kind of data (general rather than individualized) upon
which the algorithm relied to reach its recommendation. 73 The Wisconsin
court rejected the defendant's constitutional arguments. It reasoned that
the algorithm employed only publicly available data and data that the
defendant herself supplied. Hence, the defendant could deny or explain
the epistemic ground of a prediction. 74 The court flagged the group-based,
69 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 330 (1993). For a class exposition of this
idea, see Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975)
(discussing the characteristic elements of a fair hearing and assessing their relative
importance).
70 Cf. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,239 (1973) ("The term 'hearing'

in its legal context undoubtedly has a host of meanings.").
71 Friendly, supra note 69, at 1270 ("Although the term 'hearing' has an oral connotation, I
see no reason why in some circumstances a 'hearing' may not be had on written materials
only.").
72 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Wis. 2016); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity
in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 Duke L.J. 1043, 1081 (2019) (discussing the sentencing
instrument used in Wisconsin).
73 As the defendant's expert witness Dr. David Thompson explained:
The Court does not know how the COMPAS compares that individual's history with

the population that it's comparing them with. The Court doesn't even know whether
that population is a Wisconsin population, a New York population, a California

population ... . There's all kinds of information that the court doesn't have, and what
we're doing is we're misinforming the court when we put these graphs in front of them
and let them use it for sentenc[ing].
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756-57.
74 Id. at 761-62.
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rather than individualized, nature of the data used to train the sentencing
algorithm in that case. And it refused to view the use of a gender criterion
as unconstitutional, since it was but one of several inputs to the
defendant's sentence. 75 Predictions, the court nevertheless warned, "may
not be considered as the determinative factor in deciding whether the

offender can be supervised safely and effectively in the community"
while remaining consistent with due process. 76
Finally, a right to a human decision might be created by statute. In
November 2019, Representatives Anna Eshoo and Zoe Lofgren
introduced the Online Privacy Act into the House. Section 105 of that bill

mandated "a reasonable mechanism by which [an] individual may request
human review" of an "automated processing" decision with "reasonably

foreseeable significant privacy harms." 77 And in April 2019, two
Democratic Senators introduced a bill requiring the Federal Trade

Commission (FTC) to enact regulations mandating "automated decision
system impact assessments."7 8 For certain algorithms, that assessment is
required "prior to implementation. " The FTC would have to promulgate
regulations to enforce this requirement, and both the FTC and Attorneys
General of the several states could enforce it.8 0 Although this does not
contain an individual right of action, this bill may allow suits against the
algorithms' users that may de facto preclude their deployment.
American law, in sum, does not create a right to a human decision in
so many words. Rather, such a right emerges as an unexpected implication
of the Constitution's protections of the jury trial right and due process, or
as a side effect of statutory data protection measures. To the extent that
American regulators follow the lead of the GDPR, the intellectual
foundations for such a right nevertheless exist.

75 Id. at 765 (" [T]he due process implications compel us to caution circuit courts that because
COMPAS risk assessment scores are based on group data, they are able to identify groups of
high-risk offenders-not a particular high-risk individual.").
76 Id. at 760. Separately, the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
may be triggered by interviews designed to elicit information from a defendant for the purpose
of assigning him or her an algorithmic classification associated with a longer sentence. See
Cassie Deskus, Note, Fifth Amendment Limitations on Criminal Algorithmic DecisionMaking, 21 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 237, 259-66 (2018). That constitutional question
is not well understood as an adjunct to the right to a human decision, so I leave it to one side
here.
77 Online Privacy Act, H.R. 4978, 116th Cong. § 105 (2019).
78 Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(A) (2019).
79 Id. § 3(b)(1)(A)(ii).
80 Id. § 3(a)(1), (d), (e).
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C. The Tentative Form of a Novel Right
It is too early to conclude that a robust legal right to a human decision
exists as a practical matter in either European or American law. But it
would be equally premature to deny that such a right is finding footing in

both criminal and civil domains. Article 22(1) of the GDPR will likely be
the cynosure of such a right. Although some version of that right has
existed in national or supranational European law since 1978, technical
advances in the capacity of machine learning, and in particular deeplearning tools that have emerged since the early 2000s,81 place new strain
on this status quo. New fears might spark conflict in unexpected sites. 82
But the rate of ensuing legal change is hard to predict. 83 Prohibitory
regulation of machine decisions, for example, may undermine the
business strategy of business entities that use some form of machine
learning. 84 As a result, powerful lobbies favoring expansive use of data
may oppose a broad construction of Article 22. On the other hand, those
lobbies may alternatively perceive beneficial compliance-related
economies of scale in regulation such as the GDPR. Rather than risk a
balkanized regulatory terrain, these interest groups might accept some
kind of right to a human decision as a lesser evil.
Despite this uncertainty, some tentative conclusions can be drawn in
respect to the form and force of a right to a human decision from more
recent legal developments. Two merit emphasis here.
First, a right to a human decision can be formally and functionally
articulated in quite varied guises. In form, it can vary from the explicit
" See infra text accompanying notes 106-10.
82 But not all such fears are unwarranted. See, e.g., Edward Geist & Andrew J. Lohn, How
Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?, Rand Corp.,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html
[https://perma.cc/8N4T-6CD2] (last

visited Apr. 2, 2020) ("AI has the potential to exacerbate emerging challenges to nuclear
strategic stability by the year 2040 even with only modest rates of technical progress.").
83 This is obviously not because of the difficulty of predicting technological change. Cf. Jon
Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science 9-12 (1983)

(defining "technical change" as the "manufacture and modification of tools" and discussing
possible different pathways by which such change can occur). The right to a human decision
involves a choice to refuse technological change. But there is nothing inexorable about
technological adaption and advance and so no reason that technologies cannot be abandoned.
84 MIT Tech. Review Insights, Machine Learning: The New Proving Ground for
Competitive Advantage, MIT Tech. Rev. 4 (2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603 872/machine-learning-the-new-proving-ground-for-competitive-advantage/ [https://perma.cc/Z92G-WHFD] (finding in a survey of businesses that sixty percent already employed
machine learning in some way, while only five percent had no interest in doing so in the
future).
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commitment contained in GDPR Article 22(1) to the commitment to a
(human) jury decision in the Sixth Amendment. Such a right can in
operation be imagined as a complete opt-out, or a right to an appeal.
Exposure to non-human decision making might also be minimized by
regulating the sheer volume of data flows too, for instance via individual
opt-outs of data sharing. 85
Second, American and European law appear to be following divergent
priorities in respect to the right to a human decision. In the U.S., that
principle has the most influence in criminal justice matters. By contrast,
the GDPR carves out crime- and security-related functions from its
purview, and concentrates instead on data processing by non-state actors.
Perhaps this divergence can be glossed as another instance of the
European concern with "respect and personal dignity" working out
differently from an American fervor for "values of liberty." 86 But the
obscurity of Article 22's etiology in the 1978 French data protection law
and the 1994 European Directive tells against confident diagnosis.
Whatever its origins, the net effect of this difference in domains is that
the right to a human decision will be tested first in different circumstances
in the two continents, perhaps leading over time to quite divergent legal
regimes.
Still, in neither context have legislators or judges developed a robust
theoretical account of why the particular technologies, and the distinctive
modalities of inferential reasoning they entail, should be deemed
objectionable. So there is at present a theoretical gap between the
emergent right (however it is framed) and an empirically and normatively
persuasive justification. It is that gap that this Article explores.

II.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MACHINE DECISIONS AND HUMAN

DECISIONS

To decide whether a right to a human decision is a good idea, we need
to clearly understand what kind of non-human (machine) decisions we are
concerned about; how they differ from human decision-making
processes; and how human and machine decisions in practice can be either
distinct or entangled so as to be functionally separable or inseparable. To
85 See, e.g., Assemb. B. 375, 2017-18 Leg. (Cal. 2018). It remains to be seen whether such
an opt-out from processing is effective. The inefficacy of consent-based strategies for
vindicating online privacy does not bode well for that kind of an individuated approach.
86 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
Yale L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
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that end, this Part undertakes three tasks. First, it offers a brief and nontechnical account of the relevant technologies. I focus in particular on a
class of machine-learning tools (also sometimes rather inaccurately
labeled artificial intelligence87 ) that holds the most immediate promise for
displacing human decisions. Second, I sketch the plausible technical
domain of machine decisions. Finally, I parse the technical differences
between machine and human decisions. All this sets up a more extended
normative inquiry in Part III.
A. Machine Learning as a Substitute for Human Decisions
A machine-learning algorithm, in its most general terms, solves a
"learning problem ... of improving some measure of performance when
executing some task through some type of training experience." 88 Less
abstractly, we might start with the observation that most such algorithms
come in two forms: supervised and unsupervised. 89 We can usefully
consider each in turn.
Supervised machine-learning algorithms define a function f(x) which
produces an output y for any given input x.90 Its outputs hence take the
form of a sorting of x into categories of y: 91 for example, images into the

classes of "face" and "not face"; suspects into the classes of "dangerous"
and "not dangerous"; or shoppers into the classes of "impulse purchasers"
and "not impulse purchasers." These classifications are correlational and
not causal in nature. An algorithm's performance is measured in terms of
how well it captures the strength of the relation of x to y, not by its ability
87 I avoid this term because it has a potentially wider and more ambiguous scope. Cf. Stuart
J. Russell & Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modem Approach 2-14 (3d ed. 2010)
(offering a series of alternative definitions of Al that include thinking and acting humanly as
well as rationally).
88 M.I. Jordan & T.M. Mitchell, Machine Learning: Trends, Perspectives, and Prospects,
349 Science 255, 255 (2015).
89 See LeCun et al., supra note 39, at 436, 442 (discussing the relatively higher frequency of
supervised as opposed to unsupervised instruments). I do not address reinforcement learning
here, although it is arguably a distinct form.
90 See id. at 436. This process can also be described in terms of a "classifier," rather than a
function, that examines inputs with "feature values" and outputs a class variable. Pedro

Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine Learning, 55 Comm. ACM 78, 79
(2012) ("A classifieris a system that inputs (typically) a vector of discrete and/or continuous
feature values and outputs a single discrete value, the class.").
91 The values of y must be identified ex ante by the programmer. Nat'l Research Council,
Frontiers in Massive Data Analysis 104 (2013) (noting that in supervised learning, the analyst
must actively specify a variable of interest); see Flach, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that "multi-

class classification" is "a machine learning task in its own right").
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to discern an actual causal relationship between x and y.92 Its success in

that regard is a function of the extent to which it can "optimize a
performance criterion using example data or past experience." 93 At
bottom, this task is analogous to the function performed by familiar tools
such as ordinary least squares and logistic regression analysis. 94 Machinelearning tools, however, typically outperform those tools by an order of
magnitude in terms of predictive accuracy; they also tend to generate
results with lower bias and lower variance than ordinary regression. 95
They do so because their algorithms dynamically update the models used
to map relationships within the data as new examples are introduced.

They thus "learn[] rules from data" about how to better perform their task
in the course of executing it. 96
An unsupervised machine-learning algorithm employs the same
computational tools to a slightly different end. It begins with unlabeled

training data, and then develops classifications based on the data's
immanent structure rather than any ex ante guidance by the programmer. 97
Provided a set of online images, for instance, an unsupervised algorithm
might sort them into any number of categories, none of which have been
specified a priori: cats v. dogs v. rats; people v. objects, etc. These
categories can be imagined as clusters of instances in the data that are
more similar to each other than to other instances. The algorithm
identifies these clusters by constructing multiple layers of representation,
92 Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 88, at 255-57 (noting that performance can be defined in
terms of accuracy, with false positive and false negative rates being assigned a variety of
weights).
93 Alpaydin, supra note 3, at 3.
94
Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio & Aaron Courville, Deep Learning 34-35 (2016) (noting
functional similarities). In one respect, the parallel may be inexact. One of the pioneers of
machine learning, Leo Breiman, hence contrasts the data modeling approach, which starts
from the assumption that a stochastic data model describes the data in hand and then proceeds
to estimate its parameters, with an algorithmic modeling approach, which makes no
assumption about the structure of the data and then looks for a function that fits the data. Leo
Breiman, Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures, 16 Stat. Sci. 199, 199 (2001).
95 Jon Kleinberg et al., Prediction Policy Problems, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 491, 493-94
(2015). For a discussion of technical tools by which machine-learning instruments achieve
this advance beyond ordinary regression, see Esteban Alfaro, Matias Gimez & Noelia Garcia,
adabag: An R Package for Classification with Boosting and Bagging, 54 J. Stat. Software 1,
1-2 (2013) (describing the operation of "boosting" and "bagging" techniques).
96 Ziad Obermeyer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Predicting the Future-Big Data, Machine
Learning, and Clinical Medicine, 375 New Eng. J. Med. 1216, 1217 (2016); accord Pedro
Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will
Remake Our World 6-7, 23 (2015).
97 Flach, supra note 3, at 14-15.
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with each layer having a different level of abstraction. 98 By iteratively
updating the boundaries of different clusters identified within the data at
a given layer of representation, the algorithm increases within-cluster
similarity and between-cluster divergence. 99 The aim of unsupervised
machine learning, in colloquial terms, is thus "to see what generally

happens and what does not." 100
Supervised and unsupervised machine-learning tools generally rest on
distinct computational architectures. 10 1 Among the prominent forms of
unsupervised learning methods are associational learning, cluster
analysis, principal component analysis, and multi-dimensional scaling. 102
Supervised learning relies upon a number of different computational
strategies. Two common ones are worth mentioning to give just a quick
flavor of the technology. First, some supervised learning employs what
are called "neural networks." 103 The latter employ a series of layers of
"neurons," or nodes. Inputs are received by the first layer of neurons,
which apply a function that transforms those inputs. The resulting outputs
are then transmitted to other layers in the network-where they are
subject to yet further transformations-until at last they reach an output
layer. 104 Relations between the neurons are recalibrated constantly by a
learning algorithm, which reinforces connections between neurons that

Geoffrey E. Hinton, Learning Multiple Layers of Representation, 11 Trends Cognitive
Sci. 428, 429 (2007).
99 John D. Kelleher & Brendan Tierney, Data Science 100-02 (2018). The algorithm can be
understood as maximizing these parameters.
10 0
Alpaydin, supra note 3, at 11.
101 Some tools are used for both. Id. at 116 (noting the use of support vector machines for
both structured and unstructured learning). A support vector machine ("SVM") is a way of
identifying relationships among variables that would not be apparent from human inspection
of the graphical representation of such data. See Isabelle Guyon, Data Mining History: The
Invention of Support Vector Machines, KDNuggets (July 2016), http://www.kdnuggets.com/2016/07/guyon-data-mining-history-svm-support-vector-machines.html [https://perma.cc/N459-CRUY] (describing the history of the SVM by one of the scientists that modified the
algorithm in the 1990s).
102 For a more general discussion of this approach, see Trevor Hastie, Robert Tibshirani
Jerome Friedman, Unsupervised Learning, in The Elements of Statistical Learning 485 (2d
&

98

ed. 2009). In clustering, for example, "we generate a tree structure with clusters at different
levels of granularity and clusters higher in the tree that are subdivided into smaller clusters"
to "find structure in the data" that was previously unknown. Ethem Alpaydin, Machine
Learning: The New Al 117 (2016).
103

The following description of the neural net's internal operation draws on the lucid

account in Alpaydin, supra note 102, at 88-103.
104 For a useful graphical representation, see Yoshua Bengio, Machines Who Learn, Sci.
Am., June 2016, at 46, 49.
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are activated at the same time. 10 5 A second approach is the "random

forests" school of algorithms, which generate predictions by producing
thousands of decision trees mapping the data. 10 6 Each "tree" is trained on
a random sample of the training data, and the model returns a prediction
that is the majority prediction of the trees in the forest. 107 Random forests,
and the wider category of decision tree models in which they fall, are
particularly useful for nominal or ordinal data; in contrast, neural
networks work well with numerical data.1 08
A recent development that is pertinent here is deep learning. In deep
learning, an algorithm is constructed with multiple levels of

representation, each of an increasing degree of complexity. The "key
aspect" of deep learning is that "layers of features are not designed by
human engineers: they are learned from data using a general-purpose
learning procedure." 109 Deep-learning instruments are especially apt for
unsupervised tasks, with no specification of features. They require little

"manual interference," such that designers "just wait and let the learning
algorithm discover all that is necessary by itself"1 1 0

105 This is called a Hebbian learning rule. Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 99, at 127
("Training a neural network involves finding the correct weights for the connections in the
network."). The standard means to train a neutral network is with an algorithm called a
backpropagation algorithm. This works by assigning random weights to connections in the
network and then updating those weights each time a training instance is encountered. It is so
named because the algorithm passes (or backpropagates) errors from the output layer to the
input layer. Id. at 129-30; James Somers, Is Al Riding a One-Trick Pony?, 120 MIT Tech.
Rev. 29, 31 (2017) (offering a nontechnical account of backpropagation that emphasizes its
centrality to machine learning). For the seminal technical account, see David E. Rumelhart,
Geoffrey E. Hinton & Ronald J. Williams, Learning Representations by Back-Propagating
Errors, 323 Nature 533 (1986).
106 Leo Breiman, Random Forests, 45 Machine Learning 5, 5 (2001).
107 Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 99, at 141-42.
101 Id. at 136.
109 LeCun et al., supra note 39, at 436; id. at 438 ("A deep-learning architecture is a
multilayer stack of simple modules, all (or most) of which are subject to learning, and many
of which compute non-linear input-output mappings."); see Kelleher & Tierney, supra note
99, at 131 ("Deep-learning networks are simply neural networks that have multiple layers of

hidden units .... " (emphasis and footnote omitted)).
110 Alpaydin, supra note 3, at 309.
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B. The PlausibleDomain of Machine Decisions by the State
The ends to which machine-learning tools can be put by the state are
not without limit." Technical constraints on those tools have so far

guided the state's adoption decisions. They also provide markers for the
domain of potential machine decision making that is the focus of my
inquiry. In brief, the state uses machine learning to make a range of highvolume decisions turning on empirical predictions for which a large pool
of historical data is available. Absent sufficient training data, and absent
some empirical parameter to predict, machine decisions are not
appropriate.
Most machine-learning tools are used for the (non-causal) prediction
of outcomes, in the case of supervised instruments, or the identification
of clusters or associations, in the case of recommendation systems (such
as those employed by Netflix and Amazon). Kelleher and Tierney

usefully reduce the "real-world" problems amenable to machine learning
to four broad categories: the identification of clusters, or association
within a population; the identification of outliers within a population; the
development of associational rules; and prediction problems of
classification and regression. 2 In contrast, machine-learning tools are
presently of less use when a problem requires "estimating the causal effect
of an intervention." 113 An example of the perils of causal estimation with
the current crop of instruments is a recent study of the allocation of hip
replacement surgery among otherwise eligible patients." 4 The study used
machine-learning tools to identify which patients would live long enough
to benefit from the surgery. But those tools could not estimate the causal
effect of the surgery on patient welfare so as to facilitate a prioritization
among those likely to survive long enough to benefit from the surgery. 1 5
Indeed, at present in the use of machine learning, "causal inference is only

i Judea Pearl, Theoretical Impediments to Machine Learning with Seven Sparks from the
Causal Revolution (Jan. 15, 2018) (manuscript at 1-2), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RV3J-UNMK] (arguing that inability of machine learning to analyze
counterfactuals to infer causation is a major impediment).
12 Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 99, at 151-80 (providing examples of these different
tasks). Another typology of uses identifies four uses of machine learning: prioritization,
classification, association, and filtering. Bruno Lepri et al., The Tyranny of Data? The Bright
and Dark Sides of Data-Driven Decision-Making for Social Good, in Transparent Data Mining
for Big and Small Data 1, 4 (2017).
113 Athey, supra note 3, at 483.
114 Kleinberg et al., supra note 95, at 493-94.
"5 Id. at 493.
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possible when the analyst makes assumptions beyond those required for

prediction methods." 1 6
More generally, there is no suggestion in the literature that machine
learning can be employed to resolve non-empirical questions. For
instance, they cannot be used to answer ethical or other normatively
inflected questions. There is also no suggestion that machines can resolve
moral questions of priority, distribution, and belonging commonly
associated with the political domain.
At least to date, state adoptions of machine learning have reflected
these constraints. Criminal justice appears to be a leading adapter. States
use machine-learning tools to determine how to allocate policing
resources and to decide when to grant or deny bail." More
controversially, machine tools are being used to amplify the (already
large) footprint of immigration law. 1 8 There are also, however, uses of
machine tools beyond the carceral state. In a handful of states, welfare
bureaucracies have started to use algorithmic tools to sort between
recipients.119 The same is true at the federal level, although the extent of
such adoption remains unclear. The Environmental Protection Agency,
for instance, uses machine learning to evaluate the effects of some
toxins. 120 The Internal Revenue Service uses a machine-learning
instrument to predict fraud and abuse.1 21

116

Athey, supra note 3, at 484; see also id. at 485 (flagging limitations due to "incentives

and manipulability").

See Huq, supra note 72, at 1068-76 (collecting examples); see also Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1109,1122-44 (2017) (providing
a careful catalogue of predictive policing tools).
118 Spencer Woodman, Palantir Provides the Engine for Donald Trump's Deportation
Machine, Intercept (Mar. 2, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantirprovides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/ [https://perma.cc/9LDE-RKAQ] (reporting that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) awarded a private contractor
117

a $41 million contract to build an "Investigative Case Management" system to allow DHS to
"access a vast 'ecosystem' of data to facilitate immigration officials in both discovering targets
and then creating and administering cases against them").
119 See Eubanks, supra note 8, at 14-38 (describing the way in which algorithms affect lowincome defendants).
120 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Using ToxCast to Predict Chemicals Potential for
Developmental, Reproductive and Vascular Development Toxicity (Nov. 10, 2011),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-12/documents/toxcast-models-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB8W-LE5P].
121 David DeBarr & Maury Harwood, Relational Mining for Compliance Risk (2004),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04debarr.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM4U-92ZM]. For a more
recent, critical view, see Kimberly A. Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics
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Still, many decisions related to the law fall outside the domain of the
technologically plausible. There is no suggestion that a machine can make
ethical decisions of the kind infused into many public and private law
domains. Hence, machine learning provides no substitute for
paradigmatic complex civil and criminal disputes. 122 "Machine judges"
are much debated, 12 3 but it is difficult to see how they get off the ground
at least for hard cases. Machines cannot (yet?) resolve the difficult and
inescapably normative questions of aggregation, distribution, and
belonging that characterize politics.
C. DistinguishingMachine from Human Decisions
Machine learning is obviously dissimilar from human decision making.
But how? And why might that difference matter normatively? I consider
here two perspectives on those differences. First, probably the most
obvious discontinuities are related to the scale, capacity, and underlying
mechanisms of machine learning. In what follows, I first accept the
efficiency gap between machines and humans, but query its significance
for an inquiry into rights. Second, it is also sometimes said that machine
decisions are more opaque than human ones. I doubt, though, whether a
transparency gap exists. Rather, even as the opacity of an algorithm is a
function of its complexity and operational unpredictability, it is not clear
that complaints about the greaterimpenetrability of machines compared
to humans are well-founded, at least when framed as a generalization

by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End of Privacy as We Know It, 19 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech.
L. 817 (2017).
122 There is a technical literature on predicting judicial
decisions. See, e.g., Nikolaos Aletras,
Dimitrios Tsarapatsanis, Daniel Preotiuc-Pietro & Vasileios Lampos, Predicting Judicial
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing
Perspective, 2 PeerJ Computer Sci. 1 (2016). But prediction is quite distinct from the task of
ethically infused judging. Chris Johnston, Artificial Intelligence 'Judge' Developed by UCL
Computer Scientists, Guardian (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/24/artificial-intelligence-judge-university-college-london-computer-scientists
[https://perma.cc/T78A-2SYM] (quoting Nikolas Aletras, creator of the algorithm) ("We

don't see Al replacing judges or lawyers, but we think they'd find it useful for rapidly
identifying patterns in cases that lead to certain outcomes.").
123 There is some fanciful speculation on this point. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice
Robots, 68 Duke L.J. 1135, 1142 (2019) (developing the idea of "creating an Al judge that we
can use for legal decisions"); Sean Braswell, All Rise for Chief Justice Robot!, Ozy (June 7,
2015), http://www.ozy.com/immodest-proposal/all-rise-for-chief-justice-robot/41131
[https://perma.cc/3VLP-GSTN]. For a cogent argument against these ideas, see Emily
Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1277 (2018).

2020]

A Right to a Human Decision

637

rather than case-to-case comparisons.12 4 In the last Section, I take up the
necessary degree of entanglement between human and machine action.
1. How Machine and Human Decisions Diverge in Operation
In three ways, machine and human decisions diverge in basic
operation: in terms of their architecture of reasoning; in their relative
propensity to err; and in respect to the sheer capacity to complete
identification and prediction tasks. Both the second and the third
difference have normative salience-but not necessarily in ways that
support a right to a human decision.
At a very elementary level, the architecture of machine learning
diverges from that of human decision making. It is tempting to think that
some forms of computational architecture, in particular, neural networks,

track in some fashion the human brain's cognitive process.'125 But, except
at a very high level of generality, this analogy should be resisted. It is true

that the science of human cognition "influenced the emergence of
artificial neural networks." 26 Despite the verbal resonance, "a neural
network is inspired by the brain in the same way that the Olympic stadium
in Beijing is inspired by a bird's nest." 127 It is in practice more akin to
regression analysis than to the operation of human neurons. Among the

first neural networks was, for instance, the "perceptron," comprising a
single "neuron" or node, which executed a single non-linear function. 128
This bears little resemblance to the human brain. And today, whereas the

study of human cognition has aimed at taxonomizing "cell types,
molecules,

cellular states,

and mechanisms

for computation and

124 For an example of this species of complaint, see W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box
Medicine, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 419, 421 (2015) (identifying a "type of medicine [that] is
'black-box' to everyone by nature of its development[,] . . . not ... because its workings are

deliberately hidden from view").
12s Davide Castelvecchi, Can We Open the Black Box of Al?, 538 Nature 20, 21 (2016)
(asserting
that neural networks are modeled on the brain).
126
Bengio, supra note 104, at 49.
127 Jayesh Bapu Ahire, Artificial Neural Network:
Some Misconceptions, Medium (Jan. 27,
2018), https://medium.com/swlh/artificial-neural-network-some-misconceptions-cb93e80b34bb [https://perma.cc/7EXM-N6TD]; see Adam H. Marblestone, Greg Wayne & Konrad P.
Kording, Toward an Integration of Deep Learning and Neuroscience, 10 Frontiers
Computational Neuroscience 1, 1-2 (2016), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fncom.2016.00094/full [https://perma.cc/JMZ4-EPBV] (noting the importance of mathematical advances, and not neuroscience breakthroughs, in machine learning).
128 The seminal paper is Frank Rosenblatt, The Perceptron: A Probabilistic Model for
Information Storage and Organization in the Brain, 65 Psychol. Rev. 386, 387 (1958).
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information storage," the machine-learning field "has largely focused on
instantiations of a single principle: function optimization." 129 It is thus a
mistake to think that machine learning is simply a silicon-based version
of a familiar carbon-based process, even if much of the machine-learning
agenda is in some sense calibrated in terms of familiar human
capabilities. 130
A second margin along which human and machine decisions vary is in
terms of quality. Even in putatively high-quality settings, human decision
making is plagued by the distortive effects of heuristics, 131 implicit
bias, 13 2 and sheer noise. 13 3 Machine learning, importantly, is also
vulnerable to polluted training data and requires ineluctably normative
choices in crafting classification rules. 13 4 For example, text analysis of
large corpora, such as can be scraped from the World Wide Web, are
influenced by biases (race- and gender-related, for instance) that infect
the underlying texts. 13s Incautiously deployed, predictive tools can
exacerbate morally suspect social stratification. Yet at the same time, they
can also generate accurate predictions that in practice no human can
match. 13 6 For if there is a limit to the predictability of human behavior, it
has not yet been identified. 137 Even when there is a human substitute for
129 Marblestone et al., supra note 127, at 1.
130 Consider for instance the problem of reinforcement learning, in which humans are

confronted with a difficult task and must derive efficient representations of the environment
from high-dimensional sensory inputs to solve new challenges. This is a task that machine
learning is just starting to address. Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through
Deep Reinforcement Learning, 518 Nature 529, 529 (2015).
131 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65
U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 572 (1998) (discussing hindsight bias in judicial decisions).
132 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1195 (2009) (documenting implicit racial bias in the decisions of
trial judges).
133 See Daniel L. Chen & Jess Eagel, Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of
Asylum Adjudications?, Proc. 16th Edition Int'l Conf. on Artificial Intelligence & L. 237
(2017) (finding that case-relevant factors explain only about one-third of the outcomes in
asylum decisions).
134 See Huq, supra note 72, at 1111-33 (discussing flawed training data and moral choices
created by background racial inequalities).
135 Aylin
Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson & Arvind Narayanan, Semantics Derived
Automatically from Language Corpora Contain Human-Like Biases, 356 Science 183, 183
(2017).
136 For example, recent applications include better programming of traffic signals to
minimize aggregate traffic. Rose Yu et al., Deep Learning: A Generic Approach for Extreme
Condition Traffic Forecasting, Proc. 17th SIAM Int'l Conf. on Data Mining 777-85 (2017).
137 Jake M. Hofman et al., Prediction and Explanation in Social Systems, 355 Science 486,

487-88 (2017) (describing these limits as an "open" question).
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a decision, moreover, studies in a variety of fields suggest that large gains
in human well-being can be attained by using a machine-learning tool
rather than a person. 138 For instance, early deployment of driverless cars
will almost certainly reduce dramatically the social toll of traffic
accidents. 139 As I shall argue below,14 0 just as it would be a mistake to
ignore the risks involved in the design of machine-learning tools, so too
it would be an error to ignore the range of social goods that can be
generated by their employ. Rather, a key question is whether the flaws of
machine learning are easier to identify and remedy in practice than the
flaws of its human analog.
A third and related difference between machine and human decision

making is sheer capacity. An algorithmic instrument can "sift through vast
numbers of variables, looking for combinations that reliably predict

outcomes" to generate "enormous numbers of predictors-sometimes,
remarkably, more predictors than observations-and combining them in
nonlinear and highly interactive ways." 141 There are hence instances in
which machine learning can detect patterns and offer predictions that
would necessarily escape human cognition. Of course, this difference in
computational capacity does not distinguish machine learning cleanly
from other transformational technologies. No human can run as fast as a
readily available passenger car can drive. No human can execute
mathematical operations as quickly as a common pocket calculator. And
no human can see as far as a modern telescope or as deep into materials
as a modern electron microscope. Changes in the scale of capability, that
is, are endemic to technological evolution. Moreover, just like other
transformative technologies, machine-learning tools are likely to remain
outperformed by humans. Indeed, it is striking that the most sophisticated

138 Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. Econ. 237,
237-39 (2018) (discussing bail); Kleinberg et al., supra note 95, at 494 (discussing medical
decisions). In my view, the bail example is ambiguous because welfare gains depend on how
other actors in the criminal justice system respond to the prospect of more targeted instruments
of pretrial coercion. It is not at all clear their response will be to use coercion less often or
more wisely.
139 For an argument in favor of accelerated implementation of driverless cars on social
welfare grounds, see Nidhi Kalra & David G. Groves, The Enemy of Good: Estimating the
Cost of Waiting for Nearly Perfect Automated Vehicles 29 (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research-reports/RR2150.html [https://perma.cc/39WV-3SAQ] (recommending rapid
introduction of driverless vehicles on safety grounds).
14 See infra Section IIIC.
14 Obermeyer & Emanuel, supra note 96, at 1217.
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forms of deep learning are used today to execute functions such as speech
or handwriting recognition that most children manage with ease. 142
At least in theory, therefore, machine learning is capable of better (in
the sense of more accurate) predictions than humans. This capacity, to be
sure, is not always realized. But legal design, including the design of
rights, is best thought of as dynamic rather than static. That is, it should
be aimed at eliciting improvements in state action. From a dynamic
perspective, the space for improvement in machine decisions provides a
threshold hint that a right to a human decision might risk stymying
beneficial institutional changes. And at least absent some reason to think
that machine errors are irremediable in a way that human errors are not,
there is no reason to prefer the latter.
2. The Opacity of Other (Human and Machine) Minds
It is commonly asserted that algorithmic decisions derived from
machine-learning instruments are more opaque, and hence more resistant
to explanation, than human decisions. Machine learning is said to involve

processes "which [are] not explainable in human language."

143

It rests

instead on "the high-dimensionality of data, complex code, and
changeable decision-making logic." 144 This concern with transparency
seems to motivate in part the demand for a right to a human decision. 145
The empirical predicates of this claim hence warrant separate treatment.
We should first rule out here a common complaint about algorithmic
transparency. This hinges on the unwillingness of the corporate entities
14 See, e.g., Cheng-Lin Liu et al., Handwritten Digit Recognition: Benchmarking of Stateof-the-Art Techniques, 36 Pattern Recognition 2271, 2271 (2003) (reporting the accuracy of
handwriting recognition by state-of-the-art machine learning). Consider whether causal
inference is a task that, per Hume, is better viewed as a matter of imaginative conjuring rather
than induction-and hence beyond the remit of machines. Cf. Sendhil Mullainathan & Jann
Spiess, Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach, 31 J. Econ. Persp. 87, 87-88
(2017) (explaining how "machine learning algorithms are not built" for certain applications).
143 Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1503, 1519, 1568 (2013)

(acknowledging "the important strengths of transparency" but also flagging its limits in
reference to predictive tools); accord Knight, supra note 9 (advocating transparency); see also
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2014) (arguing for oversight and transparency); Alyssa
M. Carlson, Note, The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing Algorithms,
103 Iowa L. Rev. 303, 324-26 (2017) (advocating that freedom of information laws extend to
non-state providers of algorithmic tools).
144 Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate, 3 Big
Data & Soc'y 1, 6 (2016).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
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that own the machine-learning instrument to disclose their details for fear
of economic harm. 146 Such secrecy does not plainly distinguish machine
from human decisions. There is not much ultimate difference between the
use of trade secrets law, or other forms of intellectual property protection
for algorithms, and the use of contractual clauses, such as do-not-compete
clauses, to prevent the diffusion of technical information. 147 There is
nothing distinctive, that is, in the fact that it is a machine rather than a
human who is being shielded by law from examination.
More plausibly, the idea of distinctive machine opacity hinges on the
complex, recursive, and unprogrammed way in which computational

algorithms operate. Machine learning is typically applied to "problems
for which encoding an explicit logic of decision-making functions very
poorly." 14 8 The classification rule identified by a machine-learning tool
can be a dynamic function of a neural network rather the result of one
sequence of calculations. 149 But replicating or understanding the
network's emergent properties strains human imagination. Mere

examination of "complicated or obfuscated" source code reveals little
about how the program operates in the real world. 0 From an ex post
perspective, therefore, there is a sense that algorithms may not be
transparent because it is impossible to reconstruct the grounds upon which
a given decision was reached.
But this kind of preclusive ex post complexity need not be taken as a
technological given. Computer scientists have suggested that it is possible
to guarantee ex ante "a tamper-evident record that provides non-

146 For examples of this concern, see Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The
Secret
Algorithms that Control Money and Information 12-15 (2015); Rebecca Wexler, Life,
Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan. L.
Rev. 1343, 1350 (2018) (documenting "the introduction of trade secret evidence into criminal

cases").
147 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in Intellectual
Property Law, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 869, 871 (2016) (arguing that employment "contracts serve
firms as means to enclose information beyond traditional intellectual property boundaries

without adequate notice or debate").
14 8

Jenna Burrell, How the Machine 'Thinks': Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms, 3 Big Data & Soc'y 1, 6 (2016).

Id. at 8.
1" Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 647; Joshua A. Kroll, The Fallacy of Inscrutability, 376 Phil.
149

Transactions Royal Soc'y A 1, 9 (2018) [hereinafter Kroll, The Fallacy of Inscrutability]

(describing such
understanding).

disclosure as

"neither necessary

nor sufficient"

for improving
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repudiable evidence of all nodes' actions."1 51 From this record, "faulty"
nodes in a machine-learning system can be detected.15 2 In effect, the
consequences of pivotal elements of an algorithm's architecture can be
isolated and analyzed. Alternatively, it may be possible to offer "multiple

diverse counterfactual[s]" to an algorithm, testing thereby the effect of
incremental changes to input outcomes even after the fact. 153 This has a
human analog of sorts in experimental tests of the trolley problem. 5 4
Finally, some kinds of algorithmic design may be more amenable to
interpretation than others.1 55 Models that are simple to learn tend to be
simpler to represent. 156 A designer thus can, within limits, select a
computational architecture precisely for its amenability to post hoc

explanation. Alternatively, it is possible to "approximate the model" in
simpler form even after it has been created and applied in the wild. 157 The
absence of a capacity to generate an explanation of the requisite sort that
enables relevant evaluation of a machine-learning tool's effects on the

151 Andreas Haeberlen, Petr Kouznetsov & Peter Druschel, PeerReview: Practical
Accountability for Distributed Systems, Proc. 21st ACM Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles 175, 175 (2007); Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 662-72 (describing various methods
of ensuring accountability in machine decisions even without full transparency, such as
cryptographic commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, and fair random choices); see Deven R.
Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 Harv. J.L.
& Tech. 1, 10-11 (2017) (same).
152 Haeberlen et al., supra note 151, at 175.
153 Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, Counterfactual Explanations
Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech.
841, 851-52 (2018) ("Finding a closest possible world to x such that the classification changes
is, under the right choice of distance function, the same as finding the smallest change to x.").
Studies of deep-learning visual recognition tools reveal that even small perturbations in inputs
can generate categorical classification changes. See Sandy Huang, Nicolas Papernot, Ian
Goodfellow, Yan Duan & Pieter Abbeel, Adversarial Attacks on Neural Network Policies
(Feb. 8, 2017) (manuscript at 1), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.02284.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVL7-399X]. These are both "subject-centric" rather than model-centered approaches. Lilian
Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is
Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 18, 56 (2017).
154 See Alessandro Lanteri, Chiara Chelini & Salvatore Rizzello, An Experimental
Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem, 83 J. Bus. Ethics 789, 78990 (2008) (finding that people change their moral reasoning in response to different variations
of the trolley problem).
155 Desai & Kroll, supra note 151, at 11 n.61 (suggesting that decision tree, naive Bayes,
and rule learners are easier to interpret than neural networks or support vector machines).
156 Michael Gleicher, A Framework for Considering Comprehensibility in Modeling, 4 Big
Data 75, 82 (2016).
157 Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1110-12 (2018).
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world is "merely a design choice, not an inevitability of the complexity

of large systems."158
Given the availability of mechanisms for investigating machinelearning decisions-some of which parallel methods for understanding
human decision making-it cannot be said a priori that machines are any
more opaque than humans. 159 True, specialized tools are necessary for
interrogating algorithmic results. But the elaborate evidentiary rules that
courts have developed for evaluating human testimony suggests that
experts are just as needful for the task of understanding human testimony.
The simple fact that the diagnostic tools for understanding machine
decisions are more alien than those for human decisions does not make
them either more or less effective.
If there are not systemic reasons to think that machine decisions are
always more opaque than human decisions, consider instead the
possibility of a rough equality between human and machine transparency,
at least across the mine-run of cases. Notice that other minds are just as
much black boxes as are machine-learning instruments. Thinking remains
obdurately difficult to theorize. There is "no generally accepted theory of
how cognitive phenomena arise from computations in cortex" 160 or of

whether consciousness

serves any "significant

function"

for an

organism. 161 Nor is there even a generally held folk theory that fills the

gap. As one former biophysics professor observed, "we make decisions
in areas that we don't fully understand every day" and "can't explain the
complex,

underlying

basis

for how

we arrived

at

a particular

158 Kroll, The Fallacy of Inscrutability, supra note 150, at 3. For a useful discussion of both
why different kinds of explanation differ and how to craft effective responses, see Menaka
Narayanan et al., How do Humans Understand Explanations from Machine Learning Systems?
An Evaluation of the Human-Interpretability of Explanation (Feb. 5, 2018) (manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.00682.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5CF-KWXY].
159 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law,

86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 333, 355-56 (2019).
160 Leslie G. Valiant, What Must a Global Theory of Cortex Explain?, 25 Current Opinion
Neurobiology 15, 15 (2014).
161 David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness and Its Function, 46 Neuropsychologia 829, 831,
839 (2008) (arguing that it does facilitate "rational thinking, intentional action, executive

function, or complex reasoning").
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conclusion." 162 The bigger the decision, moreover, the less amenable it
can be to reasoned resolution. 63

The problem of human decisions' opacity is acute when it comes to
understanding other minds. We do not hold in our minds clear and distinct
(let alone accurate) explanations of how other people think. Nor do we
have direct access to their cognitive processes. Nevertheless, we are able
to interact with them successfully. We are even able to impute
meaningfully to them beliefs and other mental states in ways that are not

obviously fallacious. Further, another person's beliefs and mental states
can be interrogated after the fact (as can our beliefs about their beliefs and
mental states). Indeed, in many instances, humans "generate and store the

information needed to explain [a] decision" and can be asked to produce
that information after the fact. 164 Problems of sincerity and candor
abound. But these are not treated as insoluble by the law. Transparency
when it comes to other minds, in other words, may not always be possible
as a theoretical or practical matter. But it may also not be always needful.
Social action based on the understanding that other people have beliefs
and mental states requires a skill known as mentalizing. This is a
capability that precedes sophisticated cognition. Most people (at least
those over the age of four who are not law professors) navigate the social
world on the working assumption that other people have minds. 165 Some
reasonable proportion of the time, our beliefs about other minds are close
enough to the mark to permit effectual social interactions. 166 Further, the

162 Vijay Pande, Opinion, Artificial Intelligence's
'Black Box' Problem Is Nothing to Fear,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/opinion/artificialintelligence-black-box.html [https://perma.cc/D6AG-78S3]; see also Frank Fagan & Saul
Levmore, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules, Standards, and Judicial Discretion,

93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2019) ("The best judges, like the best athletes and teachers, are often
unable to identify the reasons for their successes.").
163 Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting, 58 Royal Inst.

Phil. Supplements 157, 158-59 (2006) (describing a category of "big" decisions that cannot
be resolved by standard cost-benefit analysis).
164 Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of Al Under the Law: The Role of Explanation
(Nov. 21, 2017) (manuscript at 9), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.01134.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN8K-4GHC].
165 Rebecca Saxe, Susan Carey & Nancy Kanwisher, Understanding Other Minds: Linking
Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging, 55 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 87, 94-95
(2004). There appear to be particular regions of the brain responsible for this capacity. Id. at

99-100.
166 Chris D. Frith & Uta Frith, Interacting Minds-A Biological Basis, 286 Science 1692,

1692 (1999) (characterizing "the capacity to understand and manipulate the mental states of
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absence of generally accessible or widely understood explanations of the
biochemical processes through which cognition occurs does not appear to

undermine the ability to mentalize or to make judgments about others'
beliefs and mental states. The absence of effectual transparency when it

comes to other people's mental processes, in short, is a problem for
philosophers.1 67 It is not necessarily a worry for the rest of us. 168
So it is far from clear that transparency is systematically more
inaccessible for machine rather than human interlocutors.1 69 In both
domains, ex ante regulation can elicit better rather than worse
contemporaneous records ex post. Technical skills are required to
interpret evidentiary records in both domains. And with machines and
humans alike, there are some reasons for thinking that transparency falls
short at least in some class of cases.17 0 A difference of a predictable and
stable sort between the two domains, as a general matter, is hard to
discern.17 1 A healthy dose of skepticism about the putative opacity gap
between machines and humans takes off the table on empirical grounds
one potential justification for the right to a human decision. If human and
machine decisions are similarly opaque, albeit in different ways, that is, a
right to the former cannot be explained in terms of mere legibility. The

other people and thereby to alter their behavior" as an important component of "social
intelligence").

167 The classic statement of the problem is Norman
Malcolm, Knowledge of Other Minds,
55 J. Phil. 969, 969-70 (1958) (invoking Mill for the question how one can know that there
are indeed other minds). There is an equally old tradition that such thoroughgoing skepticism
is self-refuting. See Anita Avramides, Other Minds 5-6 (2001) (tracing this skepticism to the
common sense philosopher Thomas Reid).
168 Recall here Samuel Johnson's famous refutation of Bishop Berkeley. See James Boswell,
Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 131 (London, Henry Washbourne 1847).
169 In other words, knowing that one is dealing with a machine or a human may not tell you
much about how transparent a decision is going to be. Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 164, at 9

("[T]here may be situations in which it is possible to demand more from humans, and other
situations in which it might be possible to hold Al systems to a higher standard of

explanation.").
170 Moreover, some have argued that transparency is a flawed solution because it "may
occlude the true problems which rest in societal power relations and institutions as much as

the software tools employed." Edwards & Veale, supra note 153, at 67; accord Mike Ananny
& Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its
Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 New Media & Soc'y 973, 979-80 (2018)

(offering a critique of transparency as a "neoliberal" solution).
171 Paradoxically, there may be more ways of checking algorithmic decisions than human
decisions. Consider, for example, the robustness of encryption algorithms, which rest not on
"explanation" but on formal mathematical proofs. See Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 164, at
11. It is hard to think of a parallel with humans.
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arguments explored in Part III, therefore, must be carefully framed to
avoid any assumption about necessary differentials in opacity.
D. Entanglementsof Human and Machine Action
There is yet one other perplexing preliminary of an empirical rather
than a legal cast: to what extent it is even plausible to imagine that there
can be a "machine decision" that is acoustically separate from a human
decision? Article 22 of the GDPR envisages the possibility of decisions
"based solely on automated processing."?172 But is there really such a
beast?
Surely not-for three reasons. First, all machine-learning tools are at
their origin the fruit of specific human design and engineering choices.
There is simply no such thing as a wholly endogenous algorithm. 1 73 And
the design of a machine-learning tool is not a mechanical task. It is
freighted with normative choices. A designer must select (inter alia) a
certain kind of algorithmic architecture-a neural network, a decision
tree-based model such as random forests, or something else. The choice
is a difficult one and is necessarily evaluative in character. All forms of
machine learning, moreover, have distinctive learning biases-that is,
particular functions that they are more likely to employ during analysis.

Finding the "best match" between an algorithm's learning bias and a data
set impels an exercise of human judgment. 174
The call for human judgment does not end there. Consider the process
of a deep-learning instrument's start-up. In this form of machine learning,

a multilayered neural network must be created. The instrument's designer
must determine how many layers to build in, and how many neutrons to
include in each layer. The designer must then decide how to connect the
network's different elements. She might choose to create a recurrent

172

GDPR, supra note 20, art. 22(1) (emphasis added).

173

In late 2017, Google announced its AutoML project, which aimed to create "a machine-

learning algorithm that learns to build other machine-learning algorithms." Cade Metz, This
A.I. Can Build A.I. Itself: Big Tech Bypasses Humans to Accelerate Advances in Machine
Learning, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2017, at Bl. Similar research is ongoing at Carnegie Mellon
University. See Renato Negrinho & Geoff Gordon, DeepArchitect: Automatically Designing
and Training Deep Architectures (Apr. 28, 2017) (manuscript at 1), https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.08792 [https://perma.cc/G3K7-S8PB]. A human engineer is still needed to guide
some of the search processes over different potential architectures. Id.
174 Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 99, at 99-100; see also Casey & Niblett, supra note 159,
at 354 ("[H]umans are involved in all stages of setting up, training, coding, and assessing the

merits of the algorithm.").
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neural network, in which the network's topology is looped.17 5 Each
neuron processes inputs in the context of the previous inputs processed,
creating a sort of "memory." 17 6 Alternatively, she might craft a
convolutional neural network, in which localized groups of neurons are
trained to recognize particular patterns regardless of where they appear in
the data (for example, an eye or a nose in a visual recognition system).177
The choice of network topology, again, is a human decision grounded in
the quiddities of human conduct. Nothing intrinsic to the actual algorithm
can answer that question.
Second, the human role in machine learning is not limited to the initial
design of an algorithm. A designer must also select the data upon which
the machine-learning instrument is initially trained. This training data,
moreover, is generally not produced by an algorithm. It is a function of
human action. As a result, it can replicate the biases and blind spots of the
individuals who created it.178 For example, in the policing context, there
is a concern that historical arrest data, if used to motivate future force
deployment decisions, will reflect and reproduce any troubling
assumptions about racial proclivities toward crime that have been
prevalent among police officers in the past.17 9 Having collected data, a
designer needs to pre-process and transform that data, adjust the
algorithm's parameters in light of the data, and fine-tune the algorithm
based on the quality of the results. 180 The process of learning then

"require[s] close involvement by a human," who must craft labels for
training data and then generate hypotheses to guide the process of
optimization.18 1 Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan, arguing for the
175

Bengio, supra note 104, at 50.

176 Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 99, at 132-33.
177 Id. at 133; see also LeCun et al., supra note 39, at 438-39 (discussing convolutional
networks in general terms).
178 On biases, see Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 680 (" [A]lgorithms that include some
type of
machine learning can lead to discriminatory results if the algorithms are trained on historical
examples that reflect past prejudice or implicit bias .... "). On blind spots, see Kate Crawford,
Artificial Intelligence's White Guy Problem, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guyproblem.html [https://perma.cc/R8LY-D652] (noting problems that can arise from missing
data).
179 Huq, supra note 72, at 1053-54, 1115-23.
18 0
Saleema Amershi, Maya Cakmak, William Bradley Knox & Todd Kulesza, Power to the
People: The Role of Humans in Interactive Machine Learning, Al Mag., Winter 2014, at 105,

105.
181 Bengio, supra note 104, at 50-51 (flagging the risk that a "learning algorithm can get
stuck in what is called a local minimum, in which it is unable to reduce the prediction error of
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inevitability of human-machine partnerships, additionally suggest that
missing data problems mean that human "thinking about data limitations
and goal-setting" will inevitably be needed even after a system is up and
running.1 82 On their account, the implementation as well as the design
process for machine learning will usually be punctuated by "lengthy and
asynchronous iterations" of human-machine interaction that ensure that
machine learning is always critically molded by a human hand. 183
Third, once up and running, machine-learning tools still need "human
caretakers," tasked with everything from moderating the results of deeplearning algorithms used for simulating vision to serving as maintenance
workers who clean and repair the data centers used to house large pools
of information necessary for algorithms' operation.1 84
The idea of a machine that will run of its own accord, in short, appears
far from plausible. To be sure, this could change. Some deep-learning
instruments already require "very little engineering by hand" at the
operational stage (although their design still presents considerable
challenges). 185 But at least for the time being, a machine-learning
instrument rests on a foundation of human design and performancespecification decisions. The possibility of a purely machine decision,
again for now, 186 lies beyond the technological event horizon.
All this brings us back to the question of how precisely the notion of a
decision "based solely on automated processing"1 87 should be construed.
A literal understanding of the right to a human decision, it follows, is not
plausible. But that need not mean the idea of a solely autonomous
machine decision should be jettisoned. Another possible interpretation of
the intuition behind a right to a human decision would focus not on the

the neural network by adjusting parameters slightly"); see also Amershi et al., supra note 180,
at 106 (describing "iterative exploration of the model space" by practitioners once a learning

&

algorithm
is up and running).
182
Fagan & Levmore, supra note 162, at 9-10.
183 Amershi et al., supra note 180, at 105.
184 Alex Campolo, Madelyn Sanfilippo, Meredith Whittaker & Kate Crawford, Al Now, Al
Now 2017 Report 12 (2017), https://assets.ctfassets.net/8wprhhvnpfc0/1A9c3ZTCZa2KEYM64Wsc2a/8636557c5fb14f2b74b2be64c3ce0c78/_AINowInstitute_2017_Report_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FYA4-W9AV] (internal quotation marks omitted).
185 LeCun et al., supra note 39, at 436.
186 A recent survey finds a one in two chance that high-level machine intelligence will be
developed around 2040-2050, rising to a nine in ten chance by 2075. Vincent C. Muller
Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion, in
Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence 553, 566 (Vincent C. Muller ed., 2016).
187 GDPR, supra note 20, art. 22(1).
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absolute extent of human involvement but on the timing and quality of
such involvement. The design and training of machine learning that I have
stressed here occurs largely ex ante. Human involvement contemporaneous to an algorithm's operation comprises trivial or largely ministerial
action.The demand for a human decision might be construed as hinged
more narrowly on the slice of time in which a machine acts in respect to
a specific case. In other words, it demands that in the immediate
transactional frame of human-machine interaction, humans should not lie
on one temporal side of the interaction alone. Viewed through temporal
blinders, this assumes that the fact that a human engineer once upon a
time calibrated the machine with which one interacts is cold comfort, or
no comfort at all.
On this interpretation, the demand for a human decision bears a family
resemblance to a "standard," as opposed to a "rule," as defined in the law
and economics literature: a norm that is given content after regulated
subjects act rather than beforehand.1 88 Just as the rules-standards
distinction hinges on the timing (and to some extent the degree of
specification 189 ) of a norm, so the idea of a right to a human decision
introduces an assumption that ultimately the normative grounds for an
action can be supplied only by a human, rather than a machine actor,
intervening after the computational processes of an algorithm have come
to a close or by eliminating the machine entirely.190 This suggests that
to the extent that the Working Party Guidelines to Article 22(1) of the
GDPR are ambiguous, they should be interpreted as mandating
"meaningful" and ex post review. 191 This suggests that Article 22(1)
188 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 55963 (1992).
189 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92
Ind. L.J. 1401, 1407 (2017) ("Rules are precise and ex ante in nature.... Standards, on the

other hand, are imprecise when they are enacted.").
190 The explanatory memorandum for the draft Universal Guidelines for Artificial
Intelligence awkwardly recognizes the relevance of temporality by stating that, when it is not

"possible or practical to insert a human decision prior to an automated decision," then there
should be a human focus on outcomes. The Public Voice, Universal Guidelines for Artificial
Intelligence, Explanatory Memorandum and References (Oct. 2018), https://thepublicvoice.org/ai-universal-guidelines/memo/
[https://perma.cc/63G8-2G2S].
To view the
Guidelines, see The Public Voice, Draft Universal Guidelines for Artificial Intelligence (Oct.
23, 2018), https://epic.org/international/AIGuidleinesDRAFT20180910.pdf [https://perma.-

cc/G3WN-ZSKB].
191

Working Party Guidelines, supra note 51, at 20-21 (excluding from Article 22(1)

instances in which a human "reviews and takes account of other factors in making the final
decision"); see also infra text accompanying note 192.
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should be read to be violated only when there is an absence of ex post, as
opposed to ex ante, human involvement. This does not solve all of Article
22's interpretive difficulties. The GDPR, as I have noted, does not explain
how to define the content of "meaningful" review. 192 Should it be defined
in terms of substantive reconsideration of the decision on its own merits?
Or is it better to think of it as review for procedural and technical
regularity?
To summarize, the right to a human decision is not plausibly
understood to mean simply the right to a decision with some human
element, however timed and however substantive. To define the right that
way would rob it of effectual content, at least given present technological
constraints. But if it is not meaningful to speak of machine decisions that
do not have a human in the loop, there is a question as to why the timing
of necessary human involvement makes a practical difference. If the right
to a human decision is not to boil down to something like an aesthetic
preference, the normative grounds for a right timed in this fashion must
be supplied. This is the question taken up in Part III.

Machine learning denotes a large field of heterogenous and evolving
computational forms. What is mapped here barely scratches its surface. I
have stressed some of the central taxonomical lines sufficiently to allow
intelligent discussion of the right to a human decision. This allows us to
sketch a (limited) domain in which machine decisions are plausibly used.
That sketch, I hope, clarifies the following points. At a very general
level, scale (capacity) and mechanisms do vary systematically between
humans and machines, but one must be careful about leaping from that
conclusion to a claim about rights of some sort. Machines have the
capacity to classify and predict with fewer errors than humans. At least
from a dynamic perspective, this suggests that legal rules should

192 See Veale & Edwards, supra note 53, at 401 ("How this expanded notion of 'solely'
could practically be assessed from the point of view of the data controller or the data subject
is one of the significant grey areas th[e] guidance leaves in its wake."). In addition, if an

automated process does not change "legal rights" or have an "equivalent or similarly
significant" effect, the Working Party suggests that it is not covered by Article 22(1). Working
Party Guidelines, supra note 51, at 21-22 (noting that while targeted advertising is not

typically covered, the "intmsiveness" of the targeting, an individual's expectations, and the
operator's knowledge of the "vulnerabilities" of the person might render it covered by Article
22(1)).
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incentivize the creation of better machines rather than their substitution
with humans. In contrast, transparency may be a focal point for much
legal scholarship, but it does not provide a meaningful point of distinction
between humans and machines. Finally, I have suggested that most
algorithms in operation now (and arguably for the next twenty years) will
be shaped and orientated by human action. If a right to a human decision
is to have meaningful content now, therefore, it must be understood to
require human judgment at a particular moment: after a machine-learning
instrument in the wild encounters and classifies a human actor. Any other
definition is either technologically infeasible or too easily satisfied to
allow the putative right to stand as a coherent, independent entity.
III. CAN A RIGHT

TO A HUMAN DECISION BE JUSTIFIED?

With this technological context in hand, this Part explores the available
normative justifications for a right to a human decision. I focus on the
direct state applications of machine-learning tools to individuals for the
purpose of allocating benefits or burdens. Criminal justice and welfare
administration have to date been characterized by the most rapid uptake
of such tools. 193 The case of the person who is subject to coercion, or
denied a benefit, because of a mistaken machine decision is a compelling
circumstance in which to ask about a human decision right. I thus assume
that something material is at stake when the machine (or human) decides.
I identify and discuss four potential normative arguments for a right to
a human decision. The first relates to accuracyconcerns at the population
level. The second set of subject-focused arguments trains on the actions,
or potential actions, of the individual exposed to algorithmic
classification. Do machines, for example, foreclose certain opportunities
for the exercise of meaningful human agency? The third cluster of reasons
is classifier-focused. These build on the intuition that the state in
particular owes to individuals a certain species of decision making, even
if the choice between processes would not be outcome-determinative. The
final group of reasons focuses on systemic effects. This class of reasons
dilates the analytic lens, capturing the possibility of spillover
consequences that unfold only dynamically and cumulatively. I shall
argue that none of these clusters of reasons provide secure normative
ground for a right to a human decision. Instead, I argue that the domain
of plausible machine decisions is best delineated by reference to the
193 See supra text accompanying notes

30, 117, 119.
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technical constraints on such tools. These practical grounds do suggest
outer bounds to machine decision making-but are not derived from
normative theorizing.
I try here to consider the widest possible range of normative theories.
This means drawing on, but not leaning conclusively upon, precedential
arguments. So it is possible (even likely) that the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial would, as presently interpreted by the Supreme Court,
foreclose a machine decision on facts related to guilt or innocence. 19 4 This
might be relevant evidence of a widely shared moral intuition. But I do
not assume that it disposes of the normative question. I also try to avoid
tautological reliance on ambiguous and contested concepts such as
"autonomy" and "dignity." 195 Such concepts, to be sure, play important

roles in normative theorizing about the state's obligations in respect to,

say, "due process." 96 But they require specification. A 2011 survey of
Supreme Court deployments of the word "dignity" found five different
semantic usages by the Justices alone: "institutional status as dignity,
equality as dignity, liberty as dignity, personal integrity as dignity, and
collective virtue as dignity." 197 In the philosophical tradition,

Schopenhauer pointedly described dignity as "the shibboleth of all the

194 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
195 These ideas have been invoked in other scholarship on algorithmic tools as decisive
normative grounds-not always in the clearest of fashions. See, e.g., Tal Zarsky, The Trouble
with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and Fairness in
Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41 Sci. Tech. & Human Values 118, 118-19, 129
(2016) (invoking "autonomy-related concerns that also involve harms to individual dignity");
see also Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 633, 695-96 (2017)
(offering a similar argument on grounds including disparate impact and rights of informational
privacy).
196 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (identifying "individual

dignity and autonomy" as among the "fundamental liberties" protected by the Due Process
Clause); accord Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 899-906 (1981) [hereinafter Mashaw, Administrative Due
Process] (discussing dignitary definition of due process).
197 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169, 189-90
(2011) (emphasis omitted); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human
Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15 (2004)
(canvassing the use of the term "dignity" in state law and international law). For a similar
taxonomy of different usages of "autonomy," see John Christman, Constructing the Inner
Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy, 99 Ethics 109 (1988) (reviewing the
conceptions of autonomy employed in recent philosophical literature); see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 875, 877-78 (1994) (distinguishing a

"descriptive" and an "ascriptive" sense of autonomy in reference to First Amendment
debates).
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perplexed and empty-headed moralists who concealed behind that
imposing expression their lack of any real basis of morals." 98 Abstract
normative terms such as "autonomy" and "dignity" are useful only after
they have been colored and bounded through the invocation of a more
full-throated normative theory.1 99
A. Accuracy in Decision Making
The Supreme Court has at times suggested that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment creates an entitlement to an accurate

decision. 200 Typical of the Court's pronouncements in this regard is its
assertion that "[t]he function of legal process, as that concept is embodied
in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk
of erroneous decisions." 201 It is tempting to define this as a right to an
accurate and true decision: if a decision deviates from ground truth, then
I am wronged. But even in high-stakes contexts such as criminal cases or
post-conviction review of capital punishment, the Supreme Court has
shied away from a personal right to a true determination. 202 A right to
198 Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning 1 (2012) (citation omitted).
199 For example, Martha Nussbaum has employed the capabilities approach to human
wellbeing to give the idea of dignity meaningful content. Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity
and Political Entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the
President's Council on Bioethics 351, 351 (Adam Schulman & Thomas W. Merrill eds.,
2008). Jeremy Waldron uses the history of human rights law to discern a conception of dignity
that turns on a repudiation of certain kinds of social ranking. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank,
and Rights 13-78 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012). Neither of these conceptions of dignity is
obviously to the fore in the algorithmic context. Writing in a Hegelian vein, Margaret Radin
has suggested that autonomy is best understood as "abstract rationality and responsibility
attributed to an individual." Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev.

957, 960 (1982).
200

See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994) (noting that "arbitrary and

inaccurate adjudication" can violate Due Process); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 476

(1986) ("The due process protections such as notice, hearing, and right to counsel are valuable
because they contribute to the goal of accuracy.").
201 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); accord
Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993) (defining due process in terms of an

interest in an "accurate determination of the matters before the court"); Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 48 (1976)
[hereinafter Mashaw, Due Process Calculus] ("The Eldridge Court ... views the sole purpose
of procedural protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or

costs that flow from correct or incorrect decisions.").
202 See Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71 (2009) (explaining that whether

"actual innocence" exists as a federal right remains an "open question" (internal quotation

654

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 106:611

accuracy is instead understood in probabilistic terms, such as "beyond a
reasonable doubt." 203 It is further viewed as an attribute of an adjudicative

process as a whole. A system that can "reduce the risk of error over the
aggregate of cases to an acceptable level"2 04 is sufficient for constitutional
purposes.
Can a due process right to an accurate decision, understood in these
systemic, population-wide, and probabilistic terms, provide a normative
foundation for a right to a human decision? Let us bracket the idea that a
right to a human decision can be grounded on the idea that a machine is
incapable of taking new evidence from a regulated subject, 205 and instead
focus on the suggestion that humans are better than machines overall. The
evidence collated in Part II suggests that the answer will generally be no:
As Part II explained, machine learning performs a set of tasks that
overlaps those amenable to human decisions. Because the current crop of
algorithmic tools generally identify correlational rather than causal
relationships, there is a cluster of empirical questions that they are not
well designed to answer.20 6 Although an individual might have a
legitimate complaint if subject to an algorithmic decision on a matter of
causal inference or normative reasoning, her claim is not really about
accuracy so much as the inaptness of the method employed.
For the class of tasks that can be performed by either a human or a
machine-learning tool, available evidence suggests that the latter will
often generate fewer false positives and negatives in the aggregate than
most human decision making. 207 It is said that this is true in contexts such

marks omitted)); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (explaining that "actual

innocence" has never been held to be an independent constitutional claim (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
203 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]t is far

worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.").
204

Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 Tex. L. Rev.
571, 590 (1997).
205 See infra Subsection III.B.2.
206 See Mullainathan & Spiess, supra note 142, at 88 (distinguishing between predictionthe uncovering of generalizable patterns-and parameter estimation, and noting that machine
learning does well the former but not the latter). The virtue of machine-learning tools is their

use of "flexible functional forms [that] allow us to fit varied structures of the data." Id. at 9192. Note that work on causal inference through machine learning is ongoing. Perhaps in less
than a decade, this caveat will therefore be otiose.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 136-38138.
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as pretrial bail 208 and domestic violence-related arraignments, 209 although
the technical plausibility of predicting violence at an individual level has
been challenged. 210 At least if it proves feasible to predict individual
violence, it is likely implausible to hold that a right to an accurate decision
maker (in this sense) entails a right to a human decision maker in these
cases. 211 Indeed, as the conclusion explores, perhaps the opposite is true,
such that legal rules might be designed with an eye to improving, rather
than ousting, extant machine decisions.
To be sure, where the population being classified by an algorithm is
socially stratified (say, by race or by gender), and where the distribution
of errors tracks and reinforces hierarchical fault lines, I think there are
serious normative concerns that warrant careful scrutiny. But their
resolution turns out to be quite difficult. Accuracy does not provide a
useful lens. Studies of algorithmic bail tools demonstrate that the most
common population-wide measures of false positive rates cannot
simultaneously be equalized.2 12 Instead, equalizing one measure of false
positives inevitably leads to an inequality in another measure of false
positives. This puzzle, I have suggested elsewhere, is better characterized
as a problem of equity rather than accuracy. 2 13 It is not solved, in any case,
by reverting to a more error-prone human decision-making protocol. The
same maldistributions of error can arise, just with higher numbers of false

208 Kleinberg et al., supra note 138, at 237-38.

&

209 Richard A. Berk, Susan B. Sorenson & Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting Domestic
Violence: A Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 94, 110 (2016) (finding that the release rate of 20% repeat offenders in
a pool of domestic violent defendants could be dropped to a 10% rate through a move from
judicial to machine-led determinations).
210 Technical Flaws of Pretrial Risk Assessments Raise Grave Concerns 2 (2019),
https://dam-prod.media.mit.edu/x/2019/07/16/TechnicalFlawsOfPretrialML%20site.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5E9-FA8M] [hereinafter Technical Flaws].
211 It may be that an algorithmic tool is implemented in such a way that the rate of false
positives increases. But then the objection is the faulty human implementation, not the
algorithm itself.
212 Roughly speaking, there are different ways of measuring the rate of false positives and
false negatives, and the various metrics almost inevitably point in different directions. For
mathematical proof of this point, see Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making
and the Cost of Fairness, Proc. 23rd ACM SIGKDD Int'l Conf. on Knowledge Discovery
Data Mining 797, 798-99, 804 (2017); Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan & Manish
Raghavan, Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores (Nov. 17, 2016)
(manuscript at 4, 9), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807 [https://perma.cc/2W8C-X65Y].
213 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 72, at 1128-33 (analyzing how different notions of accuracy
within a population can be applied in a criminal justice context and suggesting that racial
equity is advanced by minimizing the aggregate cost to racial minorities).
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positives, with human decisions. As a result, this problem of equality and
non-discrimination should be scrutinized separately from any right to a
human decision.
B. Subject-Facing Grounds
A more plausible set of normative foundations for a right to a human
decision can be generated by focusing on the individual exposed to a
machine decision. She may feel disempowered and enervated by her
exclusion from any effectual role in the process. That is, she experiences
hedonic loss because of an absence of effectual participation. Second, an
automated decision is seemingly impermeable to human-offered reasons
relevant to the decision being taken. The machine, in other words,
extinguishes any opportunity to give reasons that the individual may seek.
An individual may want to give reasons directly pertaining to their
treatment and the accuracy of a machine judgment or alternatively seek
to offer an explanation that runs beyond the formal scope of the governing
rule. That is, they may want to vindicate an accuracy interest with bespoke
information or else seek an exception from the rule normally applicable
to their case.
I explore here whether a right to a human decision might be predicated
on the non-instrumental interest in bare participation, or alternatively the
interest in giving (broadly understood) reasons. 214 In the end, I conclude
that there are more grounds for skepticism than hope here for finding solid
foundations on which to rest a right to a human decision.
1. ParticipationInterests
A bare right to be involved in an important decision is often treated as
meaningful even when it cannot be justified or explained in instrumental
or accuracy-related terms. That non-instrumental claim might sound in a
"deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court,"215 even if that participatory entitlement will not necessarily alter
the outcome of a proceeding. It might also be founded on the felt human

"need to explain and justify our actions," such that "the loss of the
2a I use this term to cover both factual assertions that count as justifications and those that

count as excuses. Nothing turns on the difference between them in this context.
2 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4449, at 417 (1981)).
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opportunity to do so denies our self-worth." 21 6 Participation, on this view,
creates immediate hedonic gain. 217 Alternatively, participation can be

framed as the exercise of "moral responsibility as [an] equal citizen[]"
upon which rests the law's "moral claim to the citizen's allegiance." 2 18 In
this non-instrumental vein, participation has been glossed as a morally
important manifestation of autonomy, 21 9 or as a manifestation of
dignity. 220 The overlap in the scope of those two general terms is
suggestive of their joint and overlapping ambiguity. 221
I do not think that a non-instrumental interest in participation can be
used to justify a right to a human decision. Consider first when and how
such an interest is recognized in present law. Observed practice of course
is not a precise measure of moral value. But it provides a rough guide to
the weight that an interest is generally accorded and so is a starting point
for reflection. If the law now does not recognize a participation interest in
situations akin to those in which a right to a human decision would
operate, and if there is no serious objection to that failure, that gives us a
pro tanto reason to be skeptical of arguments on its basis toward a right
to a human decision.

216 Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 196, at 903.
217 Cf. Amershi et al., supra note 180, at 111 (noting that transparency about an algorithm's
operation
is related to greater user satisfaction).
218
T.R.S. Allan, Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect, 18 Oxford J. Legal Stud.
497,

509 (1998). I am not sure I have a complete response in what follows to Allan's claim. If that
claim is the brute assertion that the state's moral legitimacy rests on a particular form of
personal participation in legal processes, then it is probably not subject to refutation by the
kind of legal and doctrinal examples I develop below. Because I offer no full-blown theory of

the state's legitimacy here, I cannot fully respond to this version of the claim. It must suffice
here for me to say that I do not find the notion that the state to be legitimate must generate
specific, personal involvement in its deliberation compelling as a general matter.
219 Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 57 (1992) ("When an
individual participates in government decisionmaking she has an opportunity not only to
influence the accuracy and enhance the legitimacy of the decision, but also to exercise
autonomy.").
220 Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 Yale L.J. 319, 347 (1957) (identifying dignity as a basic due process value);
Mashaw, Due Process Calculus, supra note 201, at 49-52 (identifying dignity as an important
consideration for due process).
221 In a different formulation of the right to participate, Lawrence Solum has focused on the
effect of participation on the legitimacy of an adjudicative system. See Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 191, 274 (2004) (arguing that "a right of

participation can be justified for reasons that are not reducible to either participation's effect
on accuracy or its effect on the cost of adjudication").
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A place where a bare right to participation is embodied especially
crisply in jurisprudence is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 222 The
latter extends to create rights to self-representation as well as to counselof-choice in the criminal adjudication context. This is so even if the
former yields no better outcomes for defendants. 223 The strength of the
autonomy-related justification for these rights remains contested among
academics. 224 In a recent choice-of-counsel case, though, a plurality of the

Supreme Court described the defendant's right to elect counsel as
"fundamental," 225 perhaps suggesting something more than an
instrumental concern.
Yet I am skeptical that the participation interest reflected in these
decisions is one of personal involvement. True, the Sixth Amendment
extends invariantly to both the right to self-representation and also the

right to choose one's own counsel. When the Sixth Amendment is
manifest through the latter form (the modal case), there is no interest in
personal participation at stake. What is at stake instead is the free choice

of agents (lawyers) who will act as an individual's representation in a
given proceeding. Given the centrality of lawyers in the criminal process,
it is reasonable to think that the relevant autonomy protected by the Sixth
Amendment is the interest in electing one 's counsel-and not
participation for its own sake. Consistent with this intuition is the fact
that, when a criminal defendant exercises a right to self-representation,

222

See U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...

have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
223
Farettav. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) ("The Sixth Amendment does not provide
merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the
right to make his defense."). For counsel-of-choice doctrine, see United States v. GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) ("[The Sixth Amendment] commands, not that a trial be fair,
but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided-to wit, that the accused be defended

by the counsel he believes to be best."). See also Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268
(1984) (reasoning that this right "reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's free
choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding"). The relationship
between representation and adjudicative outcomes is a complex and difficult one. For an
insightful empirical analysis in the civil context, see D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of
Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and
Prospects for the Future, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 901, 903-04 (2013).
224 Compare John Rappaport, The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right to

Counsel of Choice, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 117, 118 (concluding that "majestic-sounding notions
of fairness and autonomy, respectively[, ]struggle to explain counsel-of-choice doctrine"),
with Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right to Control
the Case, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1147 (2010) (defending the doctrine in autonomy terms).
225 Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality opinion).
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that right is circumscribed in highly formalized ways that establish "a
certain distance" between judges and parties. 226 A criminal defendant who
exercises her right of self-representation is not exercising a right to
represent herself in whatever fashion she wishes. To the contrary, she is
invoking a highly constrained entitlement (under conditions in which she
likely will lack the epistemic competences to navigate). So the interest in
self-representation, on this view, is a byproduct of this more general right.
It is not an instantiation of a specifically protected participation interest.
Might instead a participation-based right to a human decision be
justified by the dignity interest in hearing and understanding directly the
reasons for a decision? A threshold problem with this argument is that
machine-learning instruments may be roughly as opaque as human
decisions. 227 Indeed, it is important to notice that as a practical matter
there may well not be much phenomenological distance between the
bafflement an unschooled criminal defendant reasonably feels when faced
with the reticulate and complex forms of the criminal justice system and
the confusion elicited by an algorithmically derived outcome. For all
practical purposes, both are black boxes. And there is no real social
movement so far as I can tell to make the criminal adjudicative process
simpler-as distinct from fairer or more favorable to defendants-for its
own sake.
Worse, the argument from dignity helps itself to an empirical premise
to which it is not plainly entitled. This is the idea that personhood is
respected more by a human decision maker than a machine. In practice,
quite the opposite might well be true. Especially in the context of mass
adjudicative systems (such as welfare determinations and criminal
justice), the experience of going before a human decision maker who
rapidly, perhaps summarily, ranks you may be fraught with indignity. Not

least, there is the prospect of having one's flaws aired and evaluated by a
powerful stranger. Then, there is the risk that the decision maker may take
against you, perhaps for bad (animus-related) reasons, or perhaps because

they simply dislike you. Finally, there is an unavoidable publicity
attendant on that human decision that might weigh heavily. In contrast,
the impersonal and non-judgmental character of a machine decision might

226 Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 39, 47 (2003) ("The
formality of the procedure and the qualification of the decisionmaker as a neutral arbiter of
the law ensure a certain distance between decisionmaker and parties designed to increase the

reliability of decisions made, even while it dignifies the parties and the interests at stake.").
227

See supra text accompanying notes 143-71.
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well be more conducive to human dignity than any human-driven process.
Dignity, in short, should not simply be assumed to run with human
decision making. Instead, it may well be that in many cases our sense of
integrity and standing are best preserved by insulation from human
scrutiny. Under plausible empirical assumptions, it may well cut in favor
of a machine decision.
I am not convinced there is a hedonic argument for a participationbased right to a human decision. An ex post human decision will often be
an ineffectual response to felt psychological loss. Often, the best way of
"explaining" a discrete decision will not be through human review, which
may cast limited light on the operation of a complex algorithm. It may be
instead the intervention of another machine. At least one algorithmic tool
has been developed, for instance, as a means of "explain[ing] the
predictions of any classifier or regressor in a faithful way."228 When the
instrument most likely to yield a comprehensible account of machinelearning outputs is itself a machine, the need for a human to diagnose or
"soothe" 229 the grievances of affected individuals falls away. It must rest
not on a demand for explanation, but rather on a raw and unreasoned need
for a human interlocutor. But this need for human interaction may in turn
be a contingent feature of social experience, and that which strikes us
today as dehumanizing or insensitive will appear to our children as merely
sensible and mundane. 23 0 Right now, the demand for human review, in
the teeth of its likely costs and available alternative responses, might seem
little more than an aesthetic preference about the manner in which one
interacts with state actors. I am not sure that is enough to get a right to a
human decision off the ground.
Finally, perhaps an individual subject to a machine decision seeks ex
post human review not because she thinks the decision incorrect, but
because she hopes that exogenous factors will prompt some mitigation of

the decision's consequences. She seeks, in other words, mercy-or the

228 Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh & Carlos Guestrin, "Why Should I Trust You?"
Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, Proc. 22nd ACM SIGKDD Int'l Conf. on
Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining 1135, 1135 (2016).
229 Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Mandatory Process, 90 Ind. L.J. 1429, 1432 (2015).
230

Robot companions capable of recognizing and dynamically responding to their charges'

mutative emotional states lie within the technological event horizon. For a review of the
current science, see Giulio Sandini et al., Social Cognition for Human-Robot SymbiosisChallenges
and
Building
Blocks,
12
Frontiers
Neurorobotics
1
(2018),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnbot.2018.00034/full
[https://perma.cc/HL2V5DUM].
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"official exercise of discretion to mitigate a legal consequence that is
otherwise a person's lawful fate." 231 But a hope for mercy is a poor
foundation for any "right" to a human decision. Mercy is generally
understood as a discretionary act to which one has no entitlement. As
such, mercy is an increasingly elusive quality even in the criminal justice
context where it has the most plausible berth. 232 Its presently penurious
titration may be unwise. But it is still hard to see why the case for reviving
mercy would begin in the algorithmic domain.
2. Reason Giving
But perhaps it is a mistake to think of participation in non-instrumental
terms. Instead, it may be better to focus on the tangible ways in which
participation can alter outcomes in ways that lead us to a right to a human
decision. There are several possible arguments to this end. Most
obviously, participation matters because of the factual contributions an
individual can make to the consideration of her case. The most important
form such a contribution might take turns on a particular individual's
ability to supply information, and more generally to offer reasons, for a
decision to be made in her favor to a human decision maker.23 3 Recall that

this is the force of Cathy O'Neil's anecdote about the welfare applicant
Catherine Taylor, which I recounted earlier 234 : Only Taylor, we are to
presume, had the information needful for a right resolution of her own
case. And only human review could have elicited that information.

231

Aziz Z. Huq, The Difficulties of Democratic Mercy, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1679, 1681

(2015). Mercy generally involves a "remission of deserved punishment, in part or in whole, to
criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke compassion or sympathy but that

are morally unrelated to the offender's competence and ability to choose to engage in criminal
conduct." Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1436 (2004). There will be
some instances in which mercy so defined can be exercised even after an algorithmic classifier
has been used to impose a decision.
232 On the decline of the pardon, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1348-49 (2008). On the decline of
the jury as a mitigating institution, see Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside
the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 433, 492-94 (1998).
233 In discussing the right to give reasons in this Subsection, I will not distinguish between

an individual's ability to offer empirical evidence and her ability to proffer legal or normative
claims that do not rest on information about the world. I suspect that in practice reason giving
will entail some blend of factual and normative assertions. To distinguish them here serves no
useful purpose.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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This argument from reason giving closely complements the most
plausible technological understanding of a right to a human decision. As
Part II explored, human decisions permeate and structure machinelearning tools. 235 The most plausible gloss of a claim to additional human
input needs to hinge on an ex post human role after a machine-learning
decision has been delivered. That would mean an individual subject to a
machine decision could respond directly to that decision by drawing it to

a human's attention. Such a right might respond to the possibility, for
instance, that the "feature values" used to train an algorithm excluded
some parameter of relevance to a subset of individuals, but not the general
population. 23 6 Or such a right to give reasons might also be defended on
outcome-independent, yet instrumental, grounds. In the longer term, for
example, participation might work as a balm to those whose causes
falter. 237 Consistent with this view, the literature on procedural justice
associated with Tom Tyler has pressed the empirical claim that the
opportunity to be heard by an official is associated with higher rates of
legal compliance after an interaction has passed. 23 8 Systemic legitimacy,
on the procedural justice view, flows from an embedding of the
opportunity to embed reasons in the texture of citizen interactions with
the legal system. 23 9
Arguments of either form might also seek doctrinal footing in the Due
Process Clause.24 The requirement of a hearing, to be sure, does not
235

See supra text accompanying notes 173-86.

236 Domingos, supra note 90, at 79; see also LeCun et al., supra note 39, at 436 (discussing
feature selection in algorithmic design).
237 For an instrumental argument to this effect sounding in behavioral economic terms, see
Lawrence, supra note 229, at 1432 ("The inherent value of participating in a dispute resolution
process comes in part from its power to soothe such a grievance when it does occur, win or

lose.").
238 Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with

the Police and Courts 7 (2002) ("There is considerable evidence that when people regard the
particular agents of the legal system whom they personally encounter as acting in a way they
perceive to be fair and guided by motives that they infer to be trustworthy, they are more
willing to defer to their directives .... "). The evidence for this effect has been recently
challenged. See Daniel S. Nagin & Cody W. Telep, Procedural Justice and Legal Compliance,
13 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 5 (2017).
239 Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies
and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 335, 345 (2011)
("Empirical research indicates that this sort of legitimacy is sustained not by an aggressive
style that subordinates individual rights but rather by something closer to its oppositepractices that can be grouped under the heading of procedural justice." (emphasis omitted)).
240 The seminal cases are Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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extend to all state decisions that directly and immediately affect
individuals. Legislation and law-like regulations promulgated by
agencies, for example, can dramatically and immediately change an

individual's rights, obligations, and exposure to coercive risk. Yet
individuals have no entitlement to individualized participation in respect
to them. 241 The boundary line between permissible legislative fiat (where
due process does not apply) and forms of government action to which due
process does attach is not wholly clear. 24 2 But it does exist. Some

commentators suggest, for example, that "due process requires an oral
hearing where particularized deprivations affecting a small number of
people based on adjudicative facts are concerned, "243 regardless of
whether the outcome is denominated as legislation. At least some of the
criminal justice and social welfare decisions for which algorithmic tools
are presently used plainly fall within this domain. This individual interest
in giving reasons is, moreover, distinct from the more general interest in
accuracy addressed above 244 : its basis is not quite that the machine itself
is inaccurate overall, but rather that the addition of human review can
eliminate a particular class of false negatives (positives) by leveraging
private information held by regulated subjects. For example, false
negatives (positives) might be generated by flawed records or erroneous
information in an otherwise accurate database-as in the case of a
machine welfare denial documented by Cathy O'Nei. 24 The fact that
state agencies may have financial incentives to maintain highly flawed
records (or at least not to correct them) and may face interest-group
pressure to precipitously adopt deeply flawed machine-learning systems
only adds to this argument's appeal.
Without denying for a moment the normative concerns raised by cases

such as Catherine Taylor's, I want to push back on the idea that a right to
a human decision can be grounded on this argument for reason giving. In
developing this point, I want to resist the temptation to conflate the short-

term gain from human review in cases such as Taylor's with the question
of dynamic optimality: that is, how adoption of such a right may well, in
" See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v.
City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
22 Friendly, supra note 69, at 1276-77 ("[I]t seems impossible at the moment
to predict at
what level, if any, the Court will set the floor below which no hearing is needed.").
2 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163,
1213 (2013).
24 See supra Section IILA.

zs See O'Neil, supra note 18, at 152-53.
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the long term, shape both desirable and undesirable outcomes. I also want
to keep in view the possibility that there is a better alternative vehicle for

addressing the normative concerns raised by Catherine Taylor's case-a
possibility to which my conclusion returns.
A first, concededly tenuous, reason for hesitation is doctrinal. It is not
clear that the Due Process Clause requires a supplemental human action
to verify the sufficiency of machine decisions. The adjudicative forms that
due process can take are often desultory.2 4 6 It is not at all obvious that
algorithmic tools cannot, outside of the specific context of the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial right, supply whatever due process is
constitutionally needful (unless their results are entirely orthogonal to the
quality being measured). This legal conclusion, however, might warrant
relatively little weight. Due process jurisprudence, after all, might simply
be wrong and in need of updating in light of technological change.
A second reason for rejecting the argument from reason giving has
more heft. Installation of a human decision as a backstop to a machine
decision might have perverse and undesirable consequences for the
regulated population that outweigh any participation-related benefits. 247
Depending on the empirics of the situation, the addition of a human

decision may become a form of "undue process" that traduces
"constitutionally mandated ceilings on government process."248 This
second point turns on the premise that not all process is "due." As Judge
Henry Friendly observed in his canonical reflection on the hearing
requirement, every additional increment of process comes at a cost, since

"procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources, [so]
that at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard

is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection." 249
Where the addition of a procedural step has the expected systemic effect

246 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (mandating "some kind of notice and afforded

some kind of hearing" for disciplined public school students, without adding much more
detail).
247 Rights often have implementation-related costs that spill over to others, who are not
exercising the right. For instance, criminal procedure rights can make law enforcement more
costly and thus reduce the extent to which the state can generate public security for all. The
argument here focuses on a different possibility: that the exercise of a right has costs that are
spread across the population putatively benefiting from the right.
248
Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 601, 630 (2006). Samaha was careful
to acknowledge the novelty of this possibility and its tension with extant doctrine. I invoke his

idea here not so much to suggest that there might be a cognizable 'undue process' claim, but
rather to press the perversity of insisting upon human involvement in certain cases.
249 Friendly, supra note 69, at 1276.
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of increasing the overall frequency of error rates, or generating some other
cost, there would be reason to pause and reconsider the mandate as a
matter of law and as a matter of public policy.

To see why a right to a human decision might be "undue process,"
consider the effect of a backstop human decision maker for all the outputs
of a machine decision-learning process in terms of net false positive and
false negative rates.250 Of course, "even well-designed" algorithmic tools
will make mistakes. 25 1 But the addition of a human backstop to a welldesigned machine decision will not necessarily increase the overall rate
of accurate judgments. As noted, machine decisions are often less errorprone than close human substitutes. 25 2 And it is not safe to assume that a
human will be able to identify and correct all of the instances in which the
machine erred, while also not generating new errors. To the contrary,
there is a real possibility that human input will lead to a higher net error
rate. Further, if a human-decision right is installed when one classification
is reached, and not the other, there is risk that the resulting errors will be
unevenly distributed across the population. Absent some reason to think
the machine was itself biased, it is hard to see how a higher,
asymmetrically distributed error rate is desirable.
There is a recent and familiar instance in which a non-machine
algorithm was supplemented with an ex post right of human review-to
dismaying systemic results. Starting in 2005, the Supreme Court
expanded judges' discretion over sentencing in federal court by rejecting
the binding force of a very elementary algorithm, the federal sentencing
guidelines. 253 Inter-judge sentencing disparities subsequently sharply
increased, in some jurisdictions almost doubling. 254 So too did racial
25o Recall that this was the position of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in respect to
algorithmic sentencing tools. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (Wis. 2016); supra text
accompanying notes 72-75.
251 Kroll, The Fallacy of Inscrutability, supra note 150, at 11.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
253 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233, 248-49 (2005) (invalidating mandatory
force
of Federal Sentencing Guidelines); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)
(rejecting heightened appellate review for out-of-guidelines sentences); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-11 (2007) (rejecting statutory constraints on sentencing); Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-55 (2007) (allowing appellate presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences).
254 Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 Stan.
L. Rev. 1, 4-5, 52 (2010) (similar result for a Massachusetts district court); Crystal S. Yang,
Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime?
Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1268, 1333 (2014) (finding that "interjudge
disparities have doubled from the period of mandatory Guidelines sentencing to post-Booker
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disparities, at least according to some studies.25 5 Perhaps there is a happy
story to be told here about the propensity of judges to match sentences on
a range of offender characteristics beyond those contained in a presentencing report. I doubt it. To date, there is instead every reason to think
judicial discretion has had dismaying and socially destructive effects. 256
Adding human input to a (simple, non-machine) algorithm may well have
done more harm than good. With this example in hand, it is possible to
see that arguments for a right to a human decision focusing on a specific
person who has been wrongly denied a benefit have the potential to

mislead 25 7 : we should be concerned not with one person's case but with
the overall mix of wrongful human or machine decisions produced by a
system.
Sentencing is no isolated case. To the contrary, there is a bushel of
cases in which "professional overrides decrease accuracy in predicting
reoffending, compared to unadjusted actuarial estimates." 25 8 A recent
study of probation officers found that human overrides of an actuarial
assessment tool decreased the overall accuracy of the system. 25 9 Another
study of overrides by probation officers of the Post-Conviction Risk
Assessment Instrument reached a similar finding. 260 And a 2005 meta-

sentencing, with a defendant potentially receiving a six-month longer sentence if assigned by

happenstance to a harshjudge").

2ss Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal

Sentencing, 44 J. Legal Stud. 75, 77 (2015) (finding "significantly increased racial disparities
after controlling for extensive offender and crime characteristics" post-Booker).
256 I do not mean to suggest that the pre-Booker regime was without faults. Inter-judge
disparities derived from inconsistent punitive preferences, however, do not appear to have
been one. The mere fact of disparities, moreover, does not alone demonstrate a flawed

arrangement. Evaluating when a disparity is unwarranted "requires an idea of why we punish."

&

Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1336, 1337 (1997).
At least the data on racial disparities between similar defendants raises substantial questions
as to whether adequate justifications can be identified.
257 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
258 Sharad Goel et al., The Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk
Assessment (Dec. 26, 2018) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3306723 [https://perma.cc/L7SJ-M6D9].
259
Jean-Pierre Guay & Genevieve Parent, Broken Legs, Clinical Overrides, and Recidivism
Risk: An Analysis of Decisions to Adjust Risk Levels with the LS/CMI, 45 Crim. Just.
Behav. 82, 94-96 (2018). For a now classic treatment, see Paul E. Meehl, Clinical Versus
Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence 119-20, 136-38
(1954) (predicting that mechanical predictive methods would outperform clinical ones).
260 Thomas H. Cohen, Bailey Pendergast & Scott W. VanBenschoten, Examining Overrides
of Risk Classifications for Offenders on Federal Supervision, 80 Fed. Prob. 12, 18-19, 21
(2016).
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study of sex offender recidivism algorithms identified actuarial
predictions as the most accurate measures available. 261 Across many
different contexts, therefore, there is no empirical reason to expect that
addition of a human override will increase overall accuracy. To the
contrary, human review seems generally to increase net error rates.
Now consider a variant of this argument: rather than permitting ex post
human review of all outcomes, only instances in which the regulated
subject suffers a disadvantage would trigger human input. That is, the
right would attach only to the Catherine Taylors of the world, and not to
those who are granted benefits. 262 This asymmetry could be sharpened.
The algorithm could be used to limit the cost of human review by isolating
a subset of individuals who might plausibly offer salient, new facts that
could result in a different outcome. For instance, an algorithm that
generated a risk parameter as a continuous variable could have a
numerical threshold as a classification rule. 263 Individuals classified as
exceeding that threshold by a small margin might be allowed to appeal.
Those who cleared the threshold by a large margin, in contrast, would
have no entitlement to a human decision through an appeal. In short, the
algorithm itself would be designed to select a subset of negative outputs
for which the addition of ex post human review might be justified in terms
of an accuracy gain. Why would a right to human review hurt in this
narrow, asymmetrical form? How, that is, could it not be due?
I am skeptical of even this refinement of the argument from reason
giving for three reasons. First, the argument for asymmetrical and
narrow-gauged ex post human review still assumes that human review
will correct false positives and only false positives-which, we have
already seen, is no sure thing. Moreover, it assumes that only meritorious
subjects of an adverse decision will appeal. But this is not likely. The class
of Catherine Taylors, that is, will not all get relief, while a class of
undeserving beneficiaries who have correctly had their claims denied
call them Elizabeth Taylors-will prevail. The latter as much as the

261 R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of Persistent Sexual

Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol.
1154, 1155, 1158 (2005).
262 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
263 For a useful exposition how prediction using a cut-off with a continuous variable might
look, see Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Problem of InfraMarginality in Outcome Tests for Discrimination, 11 Annals Applied Stat. 1193 (2017).
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former will select into the override procedure in ways that generate new
errors.
Lest this sound implausible, think about how selection into human
appeals will operate. There is no reason a priori to think that only and all
those with relevantly corrective private information will appeal ex post to
a human. It is more plausible to think that wealth or epistemic resources
or social class will predict the tendency to appeal. 264 The prospect that
this results in less errors overall is slim. Indeed, different rates of
falsification should be expected among the Elizabeth Taylors as opposed
to the Catherine Taylors. The result will be a pooling equilibrium, rather
than a separating equilibrium, in which the human decision maker is
presented with a mix of true and false private information. It is, moreover,
fantastical to think that a human decision maker has costless and
frictionless mechanisms for sorting the earnest Catherines from the

Machiavellian Elizabeths. What seems from O'Neil's threshold example
to be a simple, relatively costless step turns out on inspection, therefore,
to be highly problematic. 265
Instead, the superficial appeal of this asymmetric, narrow-gauge
human review rests (perhaps implicitly) on the assumption that there are
no costs from the reversal of true positives. But this will rarely be so. In
the bail context, for instance, the reversal of a true positive may cash out
as the avoidable commission of a serious violent crime. In the welfare
context, it means an undeserving person gets a benefit that otherwise
could have gone to a needy beneficiary. It is wishful thinking to assume
away the costs of reversed true positives under any system. I rather

264 The original insight into the problem of signaling and the possibilities of both pooling
and separating equilibrium is to be found in Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J.
Econ. 355, 362-63 (1973); see also Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game
Theory 237-38 (1994) (describing Spence's signaling game and the resulting pooling and

separating equilibria). Spence's signaling model here is useful insofar as it introduces the idea
of both pooling and separating equilibria arising in a situation in which one actor is trying to
select among a population.
265 Technical solutions to this problem are also costly. Imagine an optimal machine decision
designed to be amenable to human interpretation. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 151, at 11
n.61 (citing Jatinder Singh et al., Responsibility & Machine Learning: Part of a Process (Oct.
27, 2016) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2860048
[https://perma.cc/YF6Q-Z9JU]). This machine produces "a tamper-evident record that

provides non-repudiable evidence of all nodes' actions." Haeberlen, Kouznetsov & Druschel,
supra note 151, at 175. This record could then be examined manually to ascertain whether any
error had occurred or whether the data parameters employed in the classification rule failed to
capture a particular parameter of relevance to the individual being ranked by the classifier.
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suspect that some of the appeal of a right to a human decision trades on
an elision of these costs.
Second, it will often be the case that even an asymmetrical, narrowgauged right to human decision will either be otiose from the start or else
can be rendered irrelevant by certain forms of machine learning. An
individual's opportunity to supply reasons to a human decision maker is
relevant only if those reasons have some likelihood of influencing a

process's outcome. But for many of the decisions for which algorithms
might be employed in official hands, such as benefits eligibility or parole
revocation, the law delimits a closed set of relevant parameters. That is,
the law often employs rules picking out ex ante a fixed set of relevant
facts as opposed to open-ended standards. The most familiar example is
numerical speed limits (e.g., 50 miles per hour) versus commands to
"drive reasonably." The latter allow for consideration of enumerated and
unanticipated factors. 266 Where an algorithm is applying a legal rule rather
than a standard in this sense, it is not clear why the novel reasons or facts
that an individual subject to classification hopes to point out ex post even
matter. The very fact of selecting a rule rather than a standard as the
relevant law forecloses an assertion that unexpected facts are pertinent.
Even when the algorithm is designed to apply a standard (e.g.,
dangerousness in the bail context), it may be that the routine application
of that standard over hundreds or thousands of cases generates sub-rules
based on closed and predictable sets of parameter values. 267 These subrules will cover the field of possible facts asserted as salient to a machine
decision. Human review ex post will then rarely add anything of value. 268
Kaplow, supra note 188, at 559-63 (defining a rule as a legal norm given content before
regulated subjects act, whereas a standard is a legal norm that is given content after regulated
subjects act).
267 Such rules-standards "cycling" is observed in many legal domains. See Aziz Z. Huq
Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 Yale L.J. 346, 34950 (2016) (mapping cycles in structural constitutional law); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud
in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 598-99 (1988) (making this observation about rules in
the property-law context); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 149, 150 (2001) (identifying cycling in statutory interpretation). On the
possibility of new rules emerging through algorithmic interaction with new data, a method
called reinforcement learning, see Mnih et al., supra note 130.
&

266

268 What of the "social commitment to try to understand each other" and "the potential for
connection and community"-i.e., "empathy" and "ethical development"? Eubanks, supra
note 8, at 168. Considering the state's use of algorithms in welfare and public benefits

contexts, Eubanks argues that absent empathy, bias against minorities and women is more
possible. Id. at 167-68. I agree that animus is sometimes a failure of empathy. But expanding
the institutional space for human empathy is an immediate, or even medium-range, solution
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The interaction of closed legal rules and function selection may therefore
render otiose any claim to a human decision (or, at a minimum, make a
right to a dynamic rather than a static algorithm more plausible).
Third, recall that I have so far assumed that the parameters of the
training data were selected precisely because they enable a "faithful
measurement" of an underlying property of interest relevant to the
prediction of the target variable.2 69 The participation-based argument for
a human decision in effect may assume this is not so. That is, it assumes
that the training data's parameters are insufficiently numerous to
maximize accurate results such that ex post reason giving has a corrective
value. But if that is so, the proper response is to improve the training data
or to tweak the feature set. Retail responses, such as a right to an ex post
human decision, perversely maintain a deficient status quo. In this
fashion, they may even delay the implementation of holistic, systemic
fixes achievable through better machine decision making. Correcting
individual wrongs today, therefore, need not alleviate justice in the long
run.
This last point can be generalized. To the extent that human review is
understood as a means of verifying the integrity of an algorithmic tool in
an individual case, it is hardly clear that retail interventions with respect
to specific classification decisions is a well-fitting solution in the long
term (even if they might be a possible diagnostic tool for sniffing out
systemic problems along with audits). To the contrary, a range of static
oversight tools-which focus on the algorithm's underlying source
code-and dynamic oversight instruments-which look at the
algorithm's behavior in the wild-are alternatively available,2 7 0 and over
for failures of compassion. Absent some dramatic improvement in the street-level quality of
human judgment-and Eubanks gives no reason to think street-level officials are overnight
going to become better and fairer decision makers-such expansions will have precisely the
opposite effect she advocates: it enables biased or motivated reasoning and makes the ensuing
distortions even harder to remedy. By contrast, reform of machine tools allows ambient bias
to be mitigated centrally. Hence, the argument that one needs immediate human contact for
better state decision making is simply a fallacy. This fallacy is contradicted by some of the

twentieth-century's great achievements of social democracy, from Britain's National Health
Service to the American Great Society. Empathy, in short, is not enough: it must be acted upon
in a strategic and thoughtful fashion rather than used as a crutch for superficial and ultimately
unavailing responses.
269 David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 679 (2017).
270 Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 647-52 (describing static and dynamic testing protocols);
see also Wachter, Mittelstadt & Russell, supra note 153, at 843-44 (describing the use of
counterfactuals to conduct tests of algorithmic integrity).
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time these tools might conduce to systematic improvements that are likely
to render a right to human review superfluous. Given scarce resources,
devoting time to individualized ex post review in lieu of more systemic

testing of an algorithm's integrity will likely often generate the perverse
effects of lower overall accuracy. Hence, given the marginal nature of due
process analysis-which focuses on the discrete positive or negative
contribution from any given increment of procedural change-ex post
human review of discrete decisions will rarely be an optimizing strategy.

So what might be said to the Catherine Taylors who have been
erroneously classified by a machine?2 71 To begin, we should recall that
the mere fact of an erroneous determination does not, standing alone,
establish a legal or a moral wrong. Use of the reasonable doubt standard
in criminal trials implies that we are willing to tolerate a certain number
of erroneous convictions. The most pertinent question to ask is whether
Taylor was classified by a flawed system, not whether in her case an error
was made. And then it is far from clear that addition of a human decision
maker would reduce the net volume of errors. Evidence suggests it will
likely do the opposite. The flawed quality of a machine decision does not
imply that a human decision maker would do better. Nor will a human
decision maker better serve a putative non-instrumental interest in
participation.
Where an algorithmic tool is flawed, therefore, it does not follow that

ex post human review is "due." Rather, there is every reason to believe
that what is "due" is a better machine decision rather than a reliably
unreliable human one-as I explore briefly in the conclusion. So nothing
about my analysis here implies that some ex post verification or audits of
such computational tools to which Taylor was subject are unwarranted.
My aim is, more narrowly, to reject retail as opposed to systemic human
review as a warranted intervention. Since the right to a human decision in
its GDPR Article 22 form, as well as in its less articulate variants, is a
retail right that attaches to distinct individuals subject to algorithmic
classification, a case for systemic review simply cannot supply it with a
normative foundation.

271

See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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C. Classifier-FacingGrounds
I turn now to arguments for a right to a human decision that hinge on
the character of state action. The idea that an action can be impermissible
as a legal or a moral matter because of the way in which the state has
behaved, rather than because of its intrusion into some protected zone of
individual interest, is familiar in American law. The Supreme Court, for
instance, has affirmed that individuals are entitled to bring claims alleging
that official action rests on a violation of structural constitutional
principles such as federalism or the separation of powers, 272 even if the

same action with the same impact on an individual's interests could have
been achieved though properly constituted governmental action. Another
version of this phenomenon arises when the state acts on the basis of
impermissible considerations, such as racial or religious identity. 273 At
least notionally, state action based on impermissible grounds is unlawful
even if the same action on different motivational grounds would not be
disallowed. 274 In both these lines of cases, state action is deemed flawed
not because of its effects, but because of the manner in which the state
acted.
A classifier-focused justification for the right to a human decision
might home in upon one of two arguments. First, it might be argued that
a characteristic of lawful state action against individuals is that it is
reasoned. Algorithmic decisions, it might be argued, fail a minimal
criterion of rationality. Second, those decisions classify individuals on the
basis of group-based generalization. As such, they fail to treat them as
individuals. This latter point might be understood as a concern about

"profiling," or it might be understood as a concern about dignity.
Although both of these arguments draw upon deep normative wellsprings,
tapping anchoring intuitions in American constitutional law, I ultimately

272

Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011) (stating that "individuals ...

are

protected by the operations of separation of powers"). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the
Structural Constitution, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1435, 1490-514 (2013) (doubting this claim).
273 For examples of decisions disallowing state action that would be permitted in the absence
of impermissible considerations, see, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 704 (2007); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)

(describing the use of such classifications as "pernicious" (citation omitted)).
274 For a recent exception, see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) (upholding

an immigration-related executive order publicly justified on discriminatory grounds "because
there is persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national
security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility").
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suggest that neither provides a plausible grounding for a right to a human
decision.
1. Reasoned State Action
The idea that state action, and in particular coercive state action, ought
to be firmly grounded upon public reasons is deeply entrenched in Anglo-

American law. Giving reasons, on this account, is "a way of showing
respect for the subject, and a way of opening a conversation rather than

forestalling one."

271

It "attach[es] value to the individual's being told why

the agent is treating him unfavorably and to his having [taken] a part in
the decision." 276 A decision, on this view, is consistent with the rule of

law only if it is "comprehensible for those subject to the decision."277
From a mid-century liberal perspective, state power is legitimate when

based on "grounds of adequate neutrality and generality." 278 An ardent
libertarian might add that reason giving works as a salutary friction on
state action, generating transaction costs that may be preclusive when no
public-regarding ground for an action can be articulated. Something of
that intuition seems at work in the application of Fourth Amendment law

to preclude street stops on the basis of a "mere hunch."

279

Let us set aside the possibility that algorithms can be designed to issue
explained decisions. 28 1 The demand for reasoned state action still does not
provide an adequate basis for a right to a human decision for the simple
reason that it is itself only occasionally and incompletely met. Many state
decisions issue absent any supporting reasoning. As Lon Fuller noted in
his famous 1978 essay on adjudication, the "integrity of adjudication"

does "not necessarily" require that "reasons be given for the decision

&

275 Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 658 (1995).
276 Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, 18
Nomos 126, 127 (1977) (emphasis omitted).
277 Mireille Hildebrandt, Algorithmic Regulation and the Rule of Law, Phil. Transactions
Royal Soc'y A 1, 3 (2018) (emphasis omitted).
27 8
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
15 (1959); accord Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 34-38 (1964). On the putatively liberal
origins of the demand for reasoned generality, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 782-85
(1983).
279 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
280 For a survey of issues raised by the question of explainability, see Amina Adadi
Mohammed Berrada, Peeking Inside the Black-Box: A Survey on Explainable Artificial
Intelligence (XAI), 6 IEEE Access 52138, 52148-49 (2018).
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rendered." 281 From street stops to certiorari denials, there are many
discrete state interventions within and beyond the adjudicative context
that typically lack an explicit justification. Beyond that, statutes can
fashion extensive changes to social realities without offering anything by
way of adequate normative justification.28 2 Indeed, it is now conventional
wisdom that legislatures often enact statutory text without reaching a
consensus view of the meaning of certain clauses or sentences.
Ambiguous statutory text-the daily fare of appellate courts-arises

because "Congress had no particular intent on the subject." 283 Nor is it
plausible to think that all important adjudicative actions are reasoned in a
fulsome sense of that term. When a trial judge denies an evidentiary
objection, when an appellate court exercises discretion to permit a nonmandatory appeal, or the Supreme Court denies certiorari, it is hardly
clear there are articulable, let alone well-grounded, reasons for the
action. 284 The sheer extent of insufficiently reasoned state action is
suggestive: taking that demand at face value would in effect choke the
modern state before it could perform any of its basic obligations.
But consider a narrower version of the argument from reasoned
decision making. Perhaps when the state engages in certain coercive
actions-including the criminal justice and social welfare decision
making that now employs algorithmic tools-it cannot act on a "mere
hunch." 2 85 In this delimited category of cases, officials must have sound
cause for their actions. Even in these cases, the impression that machine
decisions are not, or cannot be, reasoned is a misleading and incomplete
one. For it is not the case that machine decisions are bereft of justifying
grounds. It is rather that those reasons are supplied at a point in time far
281 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 387 (1978).
282 Schauer, supra note 275, at 636.
283 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke

L.J. 511, 516; see also Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 15-22 (2014) (describing
deficits of awareness, agreement, foresight, precision drafting, and care as typical sources of
legislative ambiguity).
284

David Enoch has persuasively argued that the state's action ought to be evaluated solely

on the basis of their foreseeable (positive or negative) consequences rather than on their
intended, or reasoned, ends. David Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing, and the State, 13 Legal
Theory 69, 91-92 (2007) (grounding this conclusion on a comparison of individual and state
responsibility). It may be a fair implication of his account that the reasoned quality vel non of
state action is irrelevant.
285 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). But see Craig S. Lerner, Judges Policing Hunches, 4 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 25,25 (2007)

(defending hunches as "indispensable heuristic devices that allow people to process diffuse,
complex information about their environment and make sense of the world").
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removed from state action impinging upon the individual. Recall that the
design, testing, and implementation of machine-learning tools are all
thoroughly
imbricated
with purposeful
human
choice
and
28 6
Human intentions necessarily guide the choice between
intentionality.
supervised and unsupervised models; the process of feature selection; the
selection of training data; and the ongoing process of refinement and
calibration toward an optimal classifier. 28 7 Much of this intentional
human action is necessarily oriented by an understanding of the ends that
the machine will serve. The dearth of reasoned judgments in machine
decisions, therefore, is something of an optical illusion. It is not so much
that such judgments are wanting. Rather, they have already been
embedded into a classifier by the time that an algorithm is working in the
world. These encoded judgments, moreover, serve the same ends as a
demand for ex post reason giving: they function as a pre-commitment to
generality and as a safeguard against personalistic or arbitrary state
action. 288 Given their formalized literally calcified as code nature, the
reasons embedded in algorithms may be more resilient to ex post
manipulation than the reasons upon which judgments by courts are
anchored.
In sum, even if we stand on solid ground when we demand reasoned
state action-especially when it comes to the deprivation of important
human interests-our demand need not end in a right to a human decision.
To the contrary, the concerns underlying the demand might well point in
the other direction: a robustly (re-)designed algorithm thoughtfully
supplied with unbiased and illuminating training data.
2. The Right to an Individualized Decision
A right to a human decision, alternatively, might be justified by
pointing to the general character of the grounds upon which an algorithm
relies when it reaches a classification decision. Roughly stated, the
intuition here is that the state should take action against a person solely
on the basis of their own behavior or merits. It should treat them, that is,

286 See supra text accompanying notes 172-92.
287 On this iterative process of algorithmic improvement, see Bengio, supra note 104, at 50-

51; see also Amershi et al., supra note 180, at 106.
288 Cf. Schauer, supra note 275, at 651-52 (describing reason giving as a pre-commitment
mechanism that yields generality).
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"as an individual."2 89 Action based on traits shared by a larger social
group ipso facto fails to take that person seriously as an individual.
Something like this concern with the generality of justificatory grounds
is implicit in GDPR Article 22. The latter picks out "profiling" as a form
of automated processing. 290 The regulation elsewhere defines profiling
broadly as "the use of personal data to . .. predict aspects concerning [a]

natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health,
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or
movements." 29 1 The breadth of this definition, and its connection in
Article 22 to automated processing, imply a concern with algorithmic
systems that ingest large volumes of data so as to generate predictive
classifications of individuals. The implicit distinction drawn between
automated and non-automated profiles, moreover, suggests that the

GDPR's intervention is predicated on concern about the impersonal
generality, and correlative detachment from individual particulars, of

certain machine decisions. A parallel thought can be detected in courts'
skepticism about the use of specific kinds of statistical evidence to
demonstrate the likelihood of defendant responsibility in tort cases. 292
Instead, courts call for "individualized evidence." 293 Both it and the
demand for a human decision rest on a call for a particularized (rather
than a population-wide) evidentiary basis for state action.
The intuition of a right to a human decision based on a demand to be
treated as an individual can be justified by appeal to a number of
philosophical traditions. It might be warranted, first, by the Kantian
notion that an individual cannot be treated as a "mere[]" means to an
end. 294 The German Constitutional Court, for example, has invoked the
289 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, "We are all Different": Statistical Discrimination
and the
Right to be Treated as an Individual, 15 J. Ethics 47, 49 (2011).
290 GDPR, supra note 20, art. 22. Article 22 does not prohibit profiling: it prohibits certain

"decision[s]" based on profiling.
291 Id. art. 4(4).
292 Courts have sometimes said that merely "mathematical chances," Smith v. Rapid Transit
Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 470 (1945), or "[q]uantitative probability," Day v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 96
Me. 207, 217 (1902), are never sufficient for the imposition of tort liability. For a more detailed
account on the informational problem of adjudication, see Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Note,
Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1228-29 (2009).
293 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Liability and Individualized Evidence, 49 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 199, 203-05 (1986).
294
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What Is Enlightenment?
47 (L. Beck trans., Macmillan Publishing Co. 1959) (1785) ("Act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only."). This Kantian notion, it should be noted, is malleable enough that it has also been put
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impermissible state action that "verdinglicht und zugleich entrechtlicht"
("treated as objects and at the same time deprived of their rights"), and
more specifically to invalidate a provision in the 2004 Air Transport
Security Act that allowed a hijacked plane to be shot down under certain
circumstances. 295 Alternatively, this demand might be linked to the luck

egalitarian demand that one aim to "eliminate so far as is possible the
impact on people's lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or
choice of their own." 296 Because machine decisions often rely on traits
over which a person has no control, it would fall afoul of this demand.
The latter ground, however, confronts substantial difficulties given the
mismatch between many criteria of social treatment and individual
choice, as well as the difficulty of disentangling unchosen traits from
those over which choice has been exercised. 297
At first blush, it is not at all clear why algorithmic decisions should be
singled out as failing to individuate. Algorithms can be designed to take

account of "all relevant information, statistical or non-statistical" that is
"reasonably available." 298 Nor is differentiated treatment of individuals
based on their different traits and behaviors always a moral wrong. To the

contrary, a uniform rule that imposes on each an equal "share in the cost
of maintaining and preserving" the common good-think of a general

to work to justify the right to bare participation. Edmund L. Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity,
and a Kantian Injunction, 18 Nomos 172, 179 (1977) ("[P]articipation is morally valuable to
the degree that it makes determinate the moral principle that we should never treat a man as a

mere means."). On the wide range of interpretations of this version of the categorical

&

imperative, see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Humanity as an End in Itself, 91 Ethics 84, 84 (1980); see
also Alexander Somek, German Legal Philosophy and Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 343, 343-44 (Dennis
Patterson ed., 2d ed. 1999) (situating this idea in the history of German legal theory).
295 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Mar. 13, 2006, 59
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 751, 753, 758, 2006, translated in BVergG, 1 BvR
357/05, Feb. 15, 2006, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2006/02/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html [https://perma.cc/W857-5CU8]. My
thanks to Annette Zimmermann for discussion and help with understanding this phrase in the
context of German law.
296 Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, 110 Ethics 339, 339
(2000).
297 Both problems are delineated in Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31 Phil.
Pub. Aff. 5, 17-21 (2003); see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109
Ethics 287, 289 (1999) (developing three further critiques of luck egalitarian).
298 Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 289, at 54.
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draft for the military-will often be morally compelling. 29 9 Indeed, "even

good judgment" is often predicated on non-spurious generalizations. 30 0
Hence, the bare claim that a decision is morally flawed because it is
predicated on population-wide data rather than individualized evidence is
untenable.
I think a subtler approach is necessary to make sense of this argument.
Although I am not convinced that it yields a general objection to machine
decisions, I think that with certain assumptions and under certain
conditions, it can be deployed to resist specific substitutions of machine
for human decisions. What issues is much narrower, that is, than the
GDPR regime. To motivate this more fine-grained argument, it is
necessary to assume that the human decision maker will have access to
individualized evidence, whereas the machine decision maker would have
access only to statistical, or population-wide, information. Notice that
there is nothing that compels this division of epistemic labor; a machine
might be supplied with individualized evidence, while a human decision
maker might rely on statistical evidence. The assumption, however, seems
to be baked into a right to a human decision as illuminated by the anti-

"profiling" direction in GDPR Article 22.
With this assumption in hand, we can distinguish between different
kinds of machine decisions. Where the decision is a prediction, there is
no obvious objection to reliance on non-individualized evidence. If
population-wide evidence is sufficient, say, to impose seatbelt mandates
for automobiles 301 or vaccine regimes for school-age children, 302 why
should it be inadequate as a basis for more granular state actions that are
predictive in nature, such as bail and parole decisions? The absolute
epistemic quality of different kinds of evidence cannot be a basis for
distinction. Individualized evidence and population-wide evidence both
vary in quality. There is no a priori reason to think decisions based on one
will be less accurate than decisions based on the other.303

299 Annabelle Lever, Why Racial Profiling Is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and
Zeckhauser, 33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 94, 110 (2005).
300 Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 215 (2003).
301 See, e.g., Act of Nov. 8, 1984, ch. 179, 1984 N.J. Laws 948 (last amended
by Act of Jan.
18, 2010, ch. 318, 2009 N.J. Laws 2339).
302 For instance, both the District of Columbia and Virginia mandate by statute the Human
Papillomavirus vaccine for school-age girls. See D.C. Code § 7-1651.04 (2007); Va. Code
Ann. § 32.1-46 (2016).
303 See Thomson, supra note 293, at 200-02 (setting forth an example).
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But when population-based evidence is used to substantiate a matter of
historical fact for the purpose of assigning responsibility, subtly different
considerations emerge. A problem arises particularly when the purpose of
the decision is to generate a deterrence effect in the future. To adopt a
phrase developed by the philosopher Martin Smith, there are certain

limited instances in which individualized evidence "normic[ally]
support[s]" a conclusion for which it is proffered, 304 and hence is relevant
to a legal decision. To see Smith's point, imagine I have a laptop with a
screensaver that shows a blue screen nine-tenths of the time. While I am
out, my friend walks past my computer and sees a blue screen. My

friend's belief that the screen is blue is "normic[ally] support[ed]" by her
perception; my analog belief that the screen was blue is not.3 0 This can

be stated in another way. My friend's belief that the screen is blue is
counterfactually sensitive to the truth, whereas my evidence is not.3 0 6 If
we learn later that the screen was not blue at that moment, I might simply
shrug about my unlucky guess. For my friend, such indifference would
seem "out of place." 307 She should, perhaps, have her vision checked for
color blindness.
This distinction can be transposed to the legal context in the following
way. If employed as a basis for adverse action, my friend's evidence is
sensitive to historical facts in a way my evidence is not. This suggests that
whereas both kinds of evidence can be rationally employed to form beliefs
and predictions, only counterfactually sensitive evidence can be used to
generate a deterrence effect. 308 Where liability is imposed on the basis of
counterfactually insensitive grounds (i.e., statistical evidence), it will not
deter. Hence, sensitivity matters for deterrence, even if it does not matter
for prediction or perhaps some sorts of historical knowledge. 309 When a
machine decision relies on population-wide evidence, therefore, there is
a loss of deterrence effect.

304 Martin Smith, What Else Justification Could Be, 44 Nous 10, 13-14 (2010).
305 Id. (offering a more complex version of this hypothetical).

306 David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher, Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the
Legal Value of Knowledge, 40 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 197, 209-10 (2012).
307 Id. at 209.
308 Id. at 218-19.
309 There is a literature on whether probabilistic evidence can be a basis for knowledge or
rational belief. See, e.g., Henry E. Kyberg, Jr., Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief
(1961). I do not think that form of strong skepticism has salience to the questions of legal and
institutional design here.
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So it may be that the objection to the use of non-individualized
evidence comes down to a demand for optimal deterrence, and also
perhaps to our social practices of blaming. 3 10 But if evidence that is not
individualized improves accuracy, while failing to create desirable
incentives, why should that be the basis of an individual's objection? It is
the state, not the regulated individual, who has the interest in deterrence.
Moreover, recall that this line of argument is also premised on the
(probably flawed) assumption that machines only rely on population-wide
evidence, whereas human decision makers always have access to
individualized evidence. This line of argument, finally, is not enough to
explain a general right to a human decision given the manner in which
algorithmic decisions are presently employed. Most of the present uses of
machine learning by the state involve predictions, rather than findings of
historical fact upon which deterrence is based. 311 Not all concern blame,
and if the allocation of blame is viewed as the central function of a
decision tool, then machines may be just as inapt as for causal questions.
For all these reasons, I am skeptical that a concern with counterfactual
sensitivity can redeem the right to a human decision.

The classifier-facing grounds for a right to a human decision, in short,
fare no better than arguments that begin with individuals' rights. Neither
a worry about reasoned state action nor a concern with the individuated
character of evidence upon which state action rests proves satisfying.
D. Systemic Concerns and Negative Externalities
A final potential ground upon which the right to a human decision
might be defended dilates the analytic lens beyond the immediate
transaction between an individual and a machine to consider the dynamic
consequences of exclusive reliance on machine decisions on wider
patterns of state action. Although a greater number of human decisions
may have desirable systemic consequences-discussed below-these
could only with difficulty be used to sustain a free-standing individual
right. Rather, all these interests might more precisely be targeted and

310 Enoch, Spectre & Fisher, supra note 306, at 215 (noting that blame may also require

counterfactually sensitive evidence).
311 See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
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advanced through alternative interventions that do not rely on the
happenstance of individuals exercising discretion over whether, or if, to
press their legal interests. While the systemic concerns identified here
might thus provide collateral support for the right at issue, they cannot
plausibly work as its principal buttresses.
First, the enforcement of legal rights against state actors is commonly
associated with "decreased activity levels" close to a judicially enforced
threshold of liability. 312 A right to a human decision would be no different.
Exclusive reliance on machine decisions lowers the marginal cost of
exercising a given state power. The right can hence be thought of as a
kind of enervating friction on state action. But of course, whether this is
desirable will obviously depend on the nature of the activity. For example,
consider the possibility of fully automating unmanned drone planes
capable of exercising deadly force on a distant battlefield. 3 13 A thorough
excision of the human role in this context raises difficult ethical issues. 3 14
If it were the case that maintaining a human role led to a lower activity
level, without serious cost to a war effort, one might plausibly speak of
an obligation to maintain a human in the loop as a way to forestall the
rapid inflation of lethal drone use.
Second, several commentators have worried about "automation bias,"
or "the use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant
information seeking and processing."315 In effect, humans adopt a

heuristic of reliance upon automated decisions "as a replacement for more
vigilant system monitoring or decision making." 3 16 The right to a human
decision works as a prophylactic against the possibility that humans will
place excessive faith in machine decisions because of the veneer of

312 John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87,
105 (1999). The effect of the liability rule is disputed. Conventional wisdom holds that both
negligence and strict liability regimes are associated with a risk of excessive activity. Steven
Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 66-71 (1987).
313 For an acute description, see Hugh Gusterson, Drone: Remote Control Warfare 2-25
(2016).
314 See Robert Sparrow, Robots and Respect: Assessing the Case Against Autonomous
Weapon Systems, 30 Ethics & Int'l Aff. 93, 94-95 (2016) (summarizing key ethical
questions).
315 Linda J. Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better Than Individuals?,
10 Int'l J. Aviation Psychol. 85, 86 (2000).
316 Linda J. Skitka et al., Does Automation Bias Decision-Making?, 51 Int'l J. HumanComputer Stud. 991, 992 (1999).
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expertise and objectivity that infuses that technology. 317 However forceful
this concern may be-there is no strong empirical evidence in the
machine-learning context to substantiate the concern available as of yet
there are likely a number of ways to ensure against complacent reliance
on automated decision makers. Not least, one could resort to frequent
auditing. Reliance on the individuals subject to classification may be one
of a range of solutions, but it is hardly an inevitable design choice. It may
well be that individuals provide too erratic and uncertain a safeguard, such
that an alternative institutional check is wise.
A third argument for a right to a human decision focuses on the effects
of machine decisions on the distribution of social power. Machine
learning allows for gains to social welfare as a result of new or more
accurate predictions. But these gains might be unevenly distributed in
ways that trigger deep normative concern. Because machine-learning
tools require large pools of data and robust computational resources, it is
likely that they will be adopted and used by organizational entities, not
least the state, that already have asymmetrical relationships with the
public at large. Adoption of machine learning might exacerbate these
imbalances in undesirable ways. This raises the possibility that unease
concerning machine decisions rests not on their distinctive quality but on
their effects upon the relationship between the state and its subjects, or
large corporations and individual market participants. Asymmetrical
distributions of such power might undermine the possibility for
conditions of participatory democracy, if machine decisions are used to
shape political preferences. Alternatively, they might enable new, highly
intrusive forms of regulation inconsistent with some normatively wellgrounded account of individual liberty.
I am sympathetic to these concerns. But I am skeptical that an
individual right provides a meaningful response given the technological
realities and normative implications mapped in Part II and earlier in this
Part. A right to a human decision is best thought of as a response to
specific technologies, and these instruments do generate troublesome
asymmetries between persons and concentrated organizational power.
But there is no reason from this motivation alone to simply assume that
the right helps mitigate those harms. The problem is that it requires heroic
317 A recent example of automation bias arguably having catastrophic results was an oilpipeline breach in Marshall, Michigan, in 2010. David Wesley & Luis Alfonso Dau,
Complacency and Automation Bias in the Enbridge Pipeline Disaster, 25 Ergonomics Design
17, 18-20 (2017).
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assumptions to conclude that dispersed individuals-vulnerable to state
or corporate pressure along multiple margins-will be capable of using a
right to engage in collective action that effectually redresses asymmetrical
social arrangements. That is, the mere provision of rights does not
alleviate the underlying asymmetry of power. This much is evident from
a half-century of experience with procedural entitlements in the criminal

justice context, which suggests that rights' efficacy is tightly constrained
by the ability of the state (or similarly regulated actor) to find substitute
vectors of influence. 3 18 Recent experience with individual entitlements to
privacy in the social media and internet platform contexts also furnishes
cause for pessimism.319 A central problem with consent-based privacy
regimes is that consumers seem to place different values on that good
depending on whether they were asked to consider how much money they
would accept to disclose otherwise private information or how much they
would pay to protect otherwise public information. 320 They also appear to
have time-inconsistent preferences, in the sense that they are willing to
accept low rewards now in exchange for a possible "permanent negative
annuity in the future." 321
If a right to a human decision is not necessarily the best instrument to
challenge concentrated social power, at least when conceptualized as a
stand-alone instrument, is there an alternative? A more direct approach
entails a frontal attack on asymmetries of power or influence by
fragmenting the extant concentrations of social power.322 One might also
think of different ways to redistribute the surplus that results from
aggregated epistemic authority. But absent evidence that the right to a
human decision can facilitate this sort of mobilization-and I do not think
such evidence exists-we should not precipitously conclude that an

318 The classic statement of this concern is William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 64 (1997).
319 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, What Is Privacy
Worth?, 42 J. Legal Stud. 249, 250-51 (2013) (identifying sensitivity of privacy-related
preferences to subtle contextual cues).
320 Id. at 249-51.
321 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision
Making, 3 IEEE Security & Privacy 26, 31 (2005); accord Alessandro Acquisti et al., The
Economics of Privacy, 54 J. Econ. Literature 442, 442-43 (2016). For similar results, see
Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical Investigation into How
Complying with a Privacy Notice Is Related to Meeting Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J.
Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 210, 220 (2015).
322 For an argument along these lines with respect to corporate power, see Tim Wu, The
Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (2018).
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individual right provides an effectual solution to a structural and systemic
dysfunction. 323
Finally, and related to the concern about power, a human decision may
be preferred to a machine decision in order to pursue a more general
institutional design goal such as the diffusion of state authority or the
continued evolution of legal rules. In effect, the claim would be that
human decisional authority has certain positive spillovers beyond the
individual case. An argument of this kind might justify localized
substitution of human for machine decision making. But it would not
provide a global reason for such substitution. Indeed, even its local
application would hinge on other details of institutional design.
A human decision might be preferred, for example, because it
maintains the open-endedness of legal criteria, or because it injects an

element of uncertainty into law's implementation. A supervised machinelearning tool's goals must be fully specified in order to be implemented.
A resort to human decision making allows for an under-specification of
those ends. Seemingly problematic from the perspective of legality, such
under-specification of law's ends might still be desirable under certain

circumstances. It might, for example, allow law's dynamic updating over
time. It might also constitute a limitation on the authority of lawmakers
to fully define law by preserving a redoubt of free-wheeling discretionary
judgment by a back-end human decision maker. An institutional perch for
revision and second-guessing of authority has a particular attraction as an
element of a liberal constitutional democracy. Of course, there is no
reason why the institutionalization of corrigibility needs to take the form
of a human decision. Something of the kind can also be installed
elsewhere in a political system, rendering a right to a human decision
nugatory.
Alternatively, a specific machine-decision tool might be rejected on the
ground that it will impede the dynamic development of new legal rules in
a common-law fashion. A machine-learning tool, that is, might refine its
classification rule over time, but this will not necessarily yield detailed
new legal guidance for primary conduct. Again, this argument for human
decision making is contingent on the absence of other platforms for
refinement and publication of new, more detailed rules for primary
conduct.

323 I develop further possible strategies in Huq, supra note 33 (manuscript at 42-47).
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None of these systemic concerns, in short, is sufficient to motivate a
freestanding individual right. At best, a human decision in lieu of a
machine decision is a useful, although not essential instrument of
institutional design for the production of positive spillovers. Whether that
substitution is desirable, however, will depend on other elements of
institutional design. It is poorly described as an individual "right."
E. PracticalConstraintson Machine Decisions
In my view, efforts to derive a right to a human decision from
normative first principles do not succeed, despite the unease that fully
automated decision making provokes in many minds. 324 Yet this does not
mean that machines can or should always displace human action. As
Section II.A explained, machine learning is not an all-purpose tool. It
excels at empirical predictions when sufficient training data is available.
There is no reason to think that it can effectively make causal decisions
now or, more importantly, decisions with an ethical or other normative
element (now, or, indeed, any time in the foreseeable future). From these
technical bounds on machine decisions emerge a corresponding set of
guide rails for the use of such instruments.
To begin, machine decisions are inappropriate when there is
insufficient historical data or no tractable parameter that can be predicted.
The state may wholly lack the necessary training data to measure the
variable of interest, the available data may be misleading, or there may
simply be no sound conceptualization of the ultimate result of interest. An
objection in this vein has been leveled at criminal risk assessment tools,
on the ground that there is no good measure of propensity to violence. 3 25
A similar argument has been leveled against machine-based teacher
evaluation tools, on the ground that there is no well-defined parameter

that elicits a useful measure of teachers' contributions and can be used as
an outcome variable when training a machine tool. 3 26
Finally, machine decisions are not presently appropriate for decisions
with ethical or normative components. Many legal and even factual
questions resolved through civil and criminal adjudication have some
such component. To be sure, some have entertained the prospect of

Binns et al., supra note 7, at 9.
See Technical Flaws, supra note 210, at 2-3.
326 O'Neil, supra note 18, at 135-40 (critiquing existing models of teacher evaluation).
324
325
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automated adjudication. 327 But the most sophisticated of these, an
argument for machine-tooled "micro-directives" forcefully pressed by
Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett, assumes that the law pursues a
single goal (such as efficiency) and lacks normative multi-criteriality.3 28
At least in public law, there are few issues with this complexion. Rather,
the presence of normative shades in many matters presently resolved
through adjudication suggests that-at least until it is possible to settle
morals by machine-many functions that adjudication presently plays
cannot be performed by machine.
CONCLUSION:

A RIGHT

TO A WELL-CALIBRATED MACHINE DECISION?

There are reasons aplenty to be cautious about the avulsive advance of
new algorithmic technologies. These range from their effects on the labor
market to their propagation of historical bias and reinforcement of social
stratification. Normative and legal concern, however, should not be
directed at the articulation or enforcement of a right to a human decision
akin to that found in GDPR Article 22. At least where machine decisions
are plausibly employed, there is no reason to establish a countervailing
right to a human decision. Of course, there is always a risk that machines
will be deployed where their particular strengths do not fit, above and
beyond the risks of negligent or discriminatory design choices. But
avoiding those possibilities simply requires a modicum of sensitivity to
the capabilities and limits of machine learning. It does not compel
technological abstinence.
In concluding, let me offer what I hope is a provocative, albeit
tentative, thought: where machines are appropriate decision makers, there

is no reason to relax one's guard against the manifold ways in which
machine learning can go awry. Rather than thinking about a right to a
human decision, however, might we be better off limning a right to a well-

calibrated machine decision? Glimpses of such a right's foundations can
be caught, scattered across the previous analysis: I can only gather them
here briefly as a way of stimulating reflection on the possibility, and I
leave for another day a more fulsome treatment.3 2 9

327 See sources cited supra note 123.

Casey & Niblett, supra note 189, at 1419 (hinting at efficiency as a relevant single
criterion).
329 For amplifications of the points raised in this conclusion, see Huq, supra note 33.
328
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An account of the right to a machine decision would begin with the
observation that while machine-learning tools have the capacity to

improve on humans' accuracy and neutrality, many of those now
implemented by government are highly flawed.330 Even if this does not
impel a reversion to (equally flawed) human decision making, the legal
system should incentivize the correction of such errors. Its dynamic goal
should be a machine decision well-calibrated in light of constitutional
concerns. Most basically, an algorithmic tool is well-calibrated if it does
not rely on flawed training data and otherwise meets common standards
of industry performance. More work, however, needs to be done to
describe the circumstances in which algorithms are in compliance with
due process, privacy, and equality norms.
In the end, this well-calibrated machine decision maker may have
underappreciated advantages that sound in dignity and autonomy terms.
Consider the possibility of dignity gains from such a right. Algorithmic
therapists such as "Woebot," for example, now interact with between one
to two million people online; apart from being free, the algorithmic tool

is "easier to talk to" because users "don't feel judged." 331 The same point
might be made by pointing to dating algorithms, which occupy an
increasing share of the matchmaking market and which squeeze out
family and friends as intermediaries; depersonalization might facilitate
new possibilities and avoid certain forms of humiliation. 332 It is quite
possible that an algorithmic interface for welfare recipients-who are a
notoriously stigmatized group3 33 -might also reduce the psychological
costs attendant on those benefits. These examples are intended to be
suggestive rather than conclusive. But they point to ways in which new
technologies, strategically deployed, might mitigate inequality and enable
humanity-rather than the reverse.
Algorithmic technologies used by machine decisions are still in their
infancy. Now, they can be flawed in many ways. It seems too early,
330 Whittaker et al., supra note 34, at 18-22.
331
Clive Thompson, May A.I. Help You?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/14/magazine/tech-design-ai-chatbot.html
[https://perma.cc/G7GP-MNTK].
332 How the Internet Has Changed Dating, Economist (Aug. 18, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/08/18/how-the-internet-has-changed-dating
[https://perma.cc/SA9W-X5VN].
333 For a classic treatment, see Joel F. Handler & Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy,
and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1969) (documenting
experienced stigma).
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however, to assume that human decisions will be globally superior to
machine decisions such that a right to the former is warranted. Sometimes
the opposite might be true. We should, therefore, at least consider the
possibility that under certain circumstances a right to a well-calibrated
machine decision might be the better option.

